12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
“The early
attempts to create a police force in Iraq had exactly the results
that the
Hon.
Gentleman describes, as criminal elements came out of the police
forces and
may,
indeed, have deliberately gone into them in order to obtain
training. Under
the
generalship of General Jalil … we have dealt with that very problem
during the
past year
or more: a significant number of police officers have been
dismissed from
the Iraqi
police force, while others have been retrained to ensure that the
situation
does not
occur again. We have learned significant lessons from those early
days of
police
training, and we shall implement them in Afghanistan to ensure that
we do not
repeat the
problem.”
1476.
On 10 April,
Maj Gen White‑Spunner reported that the severe problems
with
police
officers were:
“… seen
here partly as an issue of training (maybe the training teams had
focused,
understandably,
more on civilian policing skills than military tactics) but more as
a
result of
deep rooted corruption and lack of loyalty to the
GOI.”1352
1477.
Maj Gen White‑Spunner
warned that there were discussions in MNC‑I and the
Iraqi
Government over whether to disband the Basra police entirely and
start again.
He also
reported that MNC‑I and CPATT were keen on the concept of Police
Transition
Teams
stating: “we will need to know how much appetite there is in the UK
to provide
these.”
1478.
The following
week, on 17 April, Maj Gen White‑Spunner
wrote:
“… daily
interaction with the IPS at the coalface (i.e. in their stations,
of which there
are over
40) would require numbers in the high 100s to be successful, plus
the
associated
force protection. My feeling from the UK police team here is that
the bill
would be
too big for the UK to source, and would involve accepting a degree
of risk
in their
modus operandi which would be unwelcome. Our approach is therefore
to
encourage
maximum CPATT involvement and consequent injection of
resources,
as the
need to rebuild the police in Basra in the next six months remains
urgent.”1353
1479.
Lt
Gen Houghton met Gen Petraeus on 25
April.1354
They discussed
force levels
and tasks
for UK and US forces in MND(SE) and agreed the following division
of
SSR tasks:
•
The UK
would provide:
{{MiTTs
for the Basra Operations Centre;
1352
Minute
White‑Spunner to CJO, 10 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
10 April 2008’.
1353
Minute
White‑Spunner to CJO, 17 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
17 April 2008’.
1354
Minute
Houghton to PSO/CDS, 26 April 2008, ‘CJO – Gen Petraeus
Meeting 25 Apr 08’.
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