9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
emerge from
Iraq with our military and political reputation intact and our
relationship
with the US
protected.”
1052.
Mr Miliband
commented that the Iraqi Government was “for the first time
since
2003”
giving full attention to Basra. In support of that, the US had
committed, “again
for the
first time since 2003, serious assets from the Multi-National Corps
to bolster
MND(SE)”.
He believed that combined US, UK and Iraqi resources “will be able
to
accelerate
the rate of positive change in Basra”, paving the way for a “proper
and
respectable
end to our role as lead partner in the coalition” in the course of
2009 and the
start of “a
broad-based and natural relationship with the new Iraq, the ‘whole
Iraq policy’
which we
have long wanted”.
1053.
To make the
transition “in good order”, Mr Miliband advised that it should
be clear
to the US
that the UK had properly completed the remaining military tasks to
which it
was
committed. That had implications for the ongoing negotiations with
the US over the
“rebalancing”
of US and UK efforts in MND(SE). Mr Miliband expressed concern
that
the UK
should “not be locked into tasks or roles which either cannot be
easily justified or
presented
domestically in the UK; or which have no discernable end and so
risk locking
us into an
open-ended commitment”. He also proposed that agreement should
be
reached
“sooner rather than later” on handing over the two-star Command of
MND(SE)
to the
US.
1054.
Concluding his
letter, Mr Miliband wrote that:
“The
opportunity in Iraq also cuts both ways. Iraq is discernibly
shaping to be an
important
and assertive regional power. We have a strong interest in
establishing a
productive
and full-scope bilateral relationship with that renascent Iraq. We
will best
do so on
the basis of a positive conclusion to our military engagement
within the
coalition
in MND(SE).”
1055.
During his
visit, Mr Miliband met Prime Minister Maliki.518
Mr Baker
reported to
the Iraq
Strategy Group that this conversation “had been held in a bad
atmosphere, with
Maliki
blaming us for all of Basra’s shortcomings, and criticising our
dealings with JAM.”
1056.
Charge of the
Knights Phase V took place in the Jumariyah district of Basra
on
28 April.519
On 1 May,
Maj Gen White-Spunner reported that:
“What is
becoming increasingly evident, as our situational awareness
improves, is
just what a
poor state the city is in, with basic services non existent in some
areas
and a
serious problem with raw sewage and mounds of rubbish on the
streets.”
518
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 28 April 2008, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 28 April’.
519
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 2 May 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 1
May 2008’.
379