6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
63.
Mr Webb
asked Mr Hoon for approval for the overall approach he had set
out, on
which he
would “be working with the Cabinet Office” before Mr Blair’s
meeting with
President
Bush in early April.
“If
specific military options start to be considered in the US, we
would of course seek
his
[Mr Hoon’s] guidance on whether the UK should participate in
planning.”
65.
Mr William
Ehrman, FCO Director International Security, who had been shown
a
draft of
Mr Webb’s advice, raised a number of questions, and asked for
a briefing for
himself and
Mr William Patey, FCO, Head, Middle East Department (MED), on
what
the MOD
considered to be the “valid options for military operations in some
specific
scenarios
against Iraq”.28
Mr Ehrman
underlined the potential legal difficulties, including
differences
between the UK and the US on the question of whether a
determination
that Iraq
was flouting UNSCRs could be made without collective Security
Council
authorisation.
66.
A DIS paper
on the possible US military options for removing
Saddam
Hussein was
issued on 5 March.
67.
The paper
provides insights into some of the judgements in the
JIC
Assessment
of 27 February, the Cabinet Office Options Paper of 8
March,
and the
thinking within the MOD which informed subsequent analysis
and
military
planning, including uncertainty about what regime might
replace
Saddam Hussein.
68.
At the request
of Air Marshal Joe French, Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI),
the
DIS
produced a paper examining “US military” options for removing
Saddam Hussein
over the
next 12 months on 5 March.29
That did
not “look at longer‑term options, such
as a covert
action programme designed to achieve regime overthrow”. The paper
did,
however,
consider Saddam Hussein’s options and likely intentions as he was
“well
aware of
the possibility of action against him”.
69.
Addressing the
feasibility of action to topple Saddam Hussein, the paper stated
that:
•
Perception
of US intent was critical to all three broad options for regime
change.
•
Assassination
or direct targeting of Saddam Hussein and the senior
regime
leadership
was “unfeasible”.
•
Sustained
airstrikes alone would not convince the Iraqi populace of
US
determination
to overthrow the regime. Airstrikes and a widespread
insurgency
with US
covert action on the ground was a “feasible option”, but it would
not
“guarantee
success”.
28
Letter
Ehrman to Webb, 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of Evil’.
29
Paper DIS,
5 March 2002, ‘Politico Military Memorandum, Removing
Saddam’.
185