The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
533.
The UK would
need “the clearest possible sense of our objectives for Iraq”.
The
UK’s
“fundamental interest in a stable region providing secure supplies
of oil to world
markets”
suggested four overarching priorities:
•
termination
of Iraq’s WMD programme and permanent removal of the threat
it
posed;
•
more
inclusive and effective Iraqi government;
•
a viable
Iraq which was not a threat to its neighbours; and
•
an end to
Iraqi support for international terrorism.
“We have
stated that regime change is not one of our objectives. But once
ground-
war started
it would rapidly become an almost inevitable outcome. The US would
not
settle
again for a 1991-style solution. The question then arises of what
constitutes
the regime.
It would certainly mean the removal of the whole of Saddam’s
family
and inner
circle.
“It is less
clear how much of any remaining military and governmental
structures we
would want
to see dismantled. This apparatus has facilitated much of what
Saddam
has done.
His influence permeates the system. But removing it entirely would
mean
the removal
of most of the structures of authority in Iraq. This could inhibit
political
and
economic reconstruction.”
535.
The FCO stated
that it was difficult to judge the extent to which
government
structures
would survive Saddam Hussein’s departure, but
concluded:
•
“The
national Ba’ath superstructure would almost certainly collapse if
Saddam
fell as a
result of military action, with the leadership seeking refuge. At
lower
levels,
Ba’ath structures might continue …”
•
Local power
lay with the Ba’ath Party leadership. The limited
supporting
bureaucracy
was unlikely to be able to take on a more extensive role “without
a
radical
overhaul”.
•
If Saddam
Hussein fell, particularly after US-led military action, “tribal,
regional
and
religious differences would probably come to the fore” in the army,
causing
splits
within and between units. It was more likely that tribal leaders
would seek
to
establish their own power bases than that the armed forces and
security
services
would transfer their allegiance en masse to any new
government.
•
It was not
clear whether there would be any enthusiasm for clerical rule
or
whether
religion would be an effective rallying point for any
post-Saddam
Hussein
administration.
202