The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
fact that
we have special influence on the US Administration”. Asked if he
could give
examples of
where that influence had changed or modified US policy, Mr Blair
replied:
“I never
like to approach it that way because it suggests almost as if you
go along
as a
supplicant … you make a case and if you are lucky you win a verdict
on
points. It
is just not like that. The truth is that we are very interlocked in
our strategic
relationship
and we discuss and deal with issues the whole time together … I
do
not put it
like ‘an influence on them’ … post-11 September … the strategic
details of
the Afghan
campaign … the new NATO-Russia relationship … we worked
terribly
closely
with the United States … I prefer to look at it as a
partnership.”101
213.
Commenting on
the impact of Mr Blair’s evidence, Mr Campbell wrote:
“… got back
for a meeting with Tom McKane, David Manning and Jonathan re
Iraq
and when to
do the documents. TB had raised the temperature another gear
by
making
clear publicly we intended to do something and also saying that
Saddam
had to be
dealt with. We agreed not to go for it yet, because it would look
like we
were going
to go to war if we did, TB having made it clear that it would be
the start
214.
Asked whether
it would have been reasonable or expedient to have
explained
publicly
much earlier that, while the UK hoped for a peaceful outcome, it
was also
preparing
for all eventualities including military action, Mr Blair told the
Inquiry:
“We had not
decided we would take military action at that point. On the other
hand
you
couldn’t say it wasn’t a possibility … I chose the words quite
carefully … the
trouble was
people kept writing, ‘They have decided. They are off on a
military
campaign
and nothing is going to stop them.’
“… had I
said – and maybe, in retrospect, it is better just to say it …
‘Yes, we are
doing
military planning, our fear was people would push you into a
position where
you
appeared to be on a kind of irreversible path to military action,
and this wasn’t
215.
From October
2001 onwards, Mr Blair and others had made statements
on
several
occasions about issues that would need to be addressed before the
UK and
the international
community would support military action in Iraq. These
included:
•
The UN
inspectors needed to be given every chance of success.
101
Minutes,
Liaison Committee (House of Commons), 16 July 2002, [Evidence
Session], Q 101.
102
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
103
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 93.
40