The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

116. The CIG assessed that any Sadrist gains were likely to come at the expense of the

“smaller independent parties, Fadilah and, to a lesser extent, ISCI and Dawa”. The Note

concluded:

“Newly registered parties to look out for include the Iraqi People’s Assembly

(a possibly proxy for JAM Special Groups), First Iraqi Gathering (formerly the

Sadrists splinter Iraqi National Gathering), the Independence and Rising Movement

(affiliated to Jaysh al-Islami) and the Iraqi Awakening Conference (formerly Sahawa

al-Iraq). Not all will win seats …”

117. On 14 July, following a visit to Iraq, Mr Day told the Iraq Strategy Group that US

negotiations on the SFA/SOFA were making little progress.40 Iraqi officials and ministers

had told him that Prime Minister Maliki wanted UK/Iraq talks on a future legal agreement,

separate and parallel to the US negotiations. But Mr Day told the Iraq Strategy Group:

“… the Iraqis wanted the UK combat role to end by mid-2009 at the latest. They

would want any residual military relationship to be far smaller and on a different

legal basis.”

118. The Iraq Strategy Group agreed that, if NSID agreed, the UK should pursue

bilateral talks with the objective of reaching agreement in October.

119. Mr Day also reported that there was “strong Iraqi interest” in an arrangement

“regularising the bilateral relationship”, perhaps through a Memorandum of

Understanding or Exchange of Letters, with the military relationship as a small

component. The Iraq Strategy Group agreed that it would be helpful to begin discussions

on future relations, but should not discuss a written agreement until after Mr Brown’s

visit to Iraq or before the UK had clarified its own strategic objectives.

120. Lt Gen Cooper reported to ACM Stirrup that “as is clear from Jon Day’s meetings

during his recent visit, there are differing views from various members of the GoI”.41

He concluded “there is a possibility that Maliki may adopt one of several positions when

he meets the PM: receptive to our suggestions, hostile and indicating that he sees

no need for UK presence or uncommitted either way”.

121. Mr Prentice told the Inquiry that for Prime Minister Maliki “the leitmotif from the start

was: when are we going to get out of chapter VII”.42

122. On 15 July, Mr Prentice called again on Ambassador Crocker, who told him that the

Iraqi Executive Council had agreed the previous day to proceed with negotiations with

the US, firstly on the SFA, then the short-term bridging Protocol and finally on the longer

term SOFA.43

40 Minute Wigan to Aldred, 14 July 2008, ‘Iraq Strategy Group, 14 July’.

41 Minute Cooper to CDS, 14 July 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (309) 14 Jul 08’.

42 Private hearing, 15 June 2010, page 36.

43 Email Oppenheim to Prentice, 17 July 2008, ‘Your Call on Ambassador Crocker, 15 July 2008’.

400