10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
968.
The BSOS
stated that the SU could:
“… respond
rapidly to conflict or pre-conflict situations on behalf of the
Government,
and in
partnership with other key players. The Unit draws upon expertise
from
across
government, the police and the military to deliver these outcomes.
It also
manages the
Civilian Stabilisation Group of over 1,000 civilian experts from
the
public and
private sector with critical stabilisation skills and
expertise.”
969.
The MOD told
the Inquiry in 2013 that Reservists mobilised through the
Military
Stabilisation
Support Group (MSSG) were routinely employed by the SU in a
civilian
capacity in
the CSG.615
The MOD
explained that the MSSG provided a full-time
Regular
Liaison Officer to the SU. The Commander of MSSG was a member of
the
SU
Management Board and attended the Building Stability Overseas Board
as an
970.
‘The UK
Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014)’, published by the
SU
in May
2014, listed four characteristics of the Government’s
approach:
•
Any action
“will be planned and implemented with an overtly political
objective
in mind,
ideally with a means of identifying success and a process of
transition
to
longer-term recovery”. In some environments the political need to
act might
make things
worse in the short term.
•
It will be
integrated and civilian-led, unifying effort across government,
including
when there
are military-led tasks such as patrols to bolster
security.
•
It will be
“flexible and targeted” and can be applied in a state or part of a
state
affected by
violent political conflict.
•
Stabilisation
“will be transitory but cannot afford to be short term in outlook
or
objectives”
and “must be planned or implemented with reference to other
parallel
or
longer-term engagement”.617
971.
The SU paper
listed three “mutually reinforcing components of
stabilisation”:
•
protecting
political actors, the political system and the
population;
•
promoting,
consolidating and strengthening political processes;
and
•
preparing
for longer-term recovery.
972.
The SU used
the example of Iraq to illustrate the importance of security as
one
of the
three components:
“… the
disbanding of the Iraqi security forces after the US-led invasion
in 2003
meant that
large numbers of previously enfranchised Sunnis at senior and
junior
levels now
had no role in the new Iraqi state. This not only created a
security
615
Letter Ryan
to Aldred, 7 June 2013, ‘Deployment of Military Reservists in a
Civilian Role’.
616
Letter Ryan
to Aldred, 17 September 2013, ‘Deployment of Military Reservists in
a Civilian Role’.
617
Paper
Stabilisation Unit, May 2014, ‘The UK Government’s Approach to
Stabilisation (2014)’.
523