6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
•
the poor state
of repair of the two hydroelectric power stations supplying all
the
power to
two northern governorates;
•
lack of
investment and maintenance since 1991.
Other
issues of concern included:
•
an “extremely
poor” telecommunications infrastructure that had
hindered
humanitarian
programmes under OFF;
•
a water
treatment system operating at 50 percent efficiency, resulting in
an
increase in
water-borne disease;
•
three years’
drought between 1999 and 2001;
•
50 percent
unemployment.
The report
stated that “every Iraqi seeks new job opportunities that will
enable them
to provide
their households with incomes and provide more food, better
clothing, and
improved
healthcare for their families”. It warned:
“Any new
war or military confrontation in Iraq could cause further damage to
the Iraqi
infrastructure
and existing weak economy. Furthermore, this would exasperate
the
high
unemployment rates already existing in Iraq. The post-Saddam
government
has to
immediately consider economic initiatives to create new jobs
through labor
intensive
projects.”
230.
Between
June and December 2002, the SPG produced six editions of a
paper
on UK
military strategic thinking.
231.
The first,
issued on 13 June, identified a “spectrum” of possible
post-conflict
commitments,
where the worst case was “a long period with a large bill”
that
would
represent “a significant burden on defence resources”.
232.
The paper
stated that the post-conflict commitment needed to be
“planned
and agreed
before we embark on military action”.
233.
On 13 June,
the SPG issued a paper on UK military strategic thinking on Iraq
to
a limited
number of senior MOD addressees.134
The paper
was “part of ongoing work
developed
by a cross-Whitehall Group [the Pigott Group] that has met on a
regular
basis to
exchange ideas and information, and undertake UK contingency
thinking …
in advance
of any detailed consultations with the US.”
234.
The SPG paper
was intended for discussion at a Strategic Think Tank on Iraq
held
by the
Chiefs of Staff on 18 June, for which the MOD has been unable to
find a record.135
134
Minute
Driver to PSO/CDS, 13 June 2002, ‘Supporting Paper for COS
Strategic Think Tank on Iraq –
18 June’
attaching Paper [SPG], 12 June 2002, [untitled].
135
Letter MOD
to Iraq Inquiry Secretariat, 23 May 2012, [untitled].
153