4.1  |  Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

66.  The JIC noted that its “knowledge of developments” in Iraq’s WMD and ballistic

missile programmes since December 1998 was “patchy”, but that “intelligence gives

grounds for concern and suggests that Iraq is becoming bolder in conducting activities

prohibited by UNSCR [UN Security Council resolution] 687”.

67.  The JIC knew “most about Iraq’s ballistic missile programme”, where there

had been “a step change in progress” over the previous two years. It knew that Iraq

was “developing longer range systems possibly up to 2,000km”, and had “good

intelligence on research and development facilities” but did “not know where the

longer range missiles will be built”.

68.  The JIC had “no clear intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear programme”. There was

“evidence of increased activity at Iraq’s only remaining nuclear facility and a growing

number of reports on possible nuclear related procurement”.

69.  The JIC judged but could not confirm that Iraq was “conducting nuclear related

research and development into the enrichment of uranium and could have longer

term plans to produce enriched uranium for a weapon. If successful, this could reduce

the time needed to develop a nuclear warhead once sanctions were lifted.”

70.  The JIC continued to assess that “while sanctions remain in place, Iraq cannot

indigenously develop and produce nuclear weapons. Were sanctions lifted, it would take

Iraq at least five years to produce a nuclear device and a further two to produce a

warhead.”

71.  The JIC had “good intelligence of Iraq’s former chemical and biological warfare

(CBW) facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production”. That suggested “a

continuing research and development programme”. There was “additional unconfirmed

but credible intelligence of weapons filling”. But the JIC could not “confirm that

specific sites” were “being used for CBW related activity”.

72.  In the main body of the Assessment, the JIC:

• judged that intelligence reports reflected “a continuing chemical warfare

programme, including research and development, together with the possible

production and weaponisation of agent”;

• stated that the picture of Iraq’s BW programme was “unclear”; and

• stated that Iraq’s CBW capability was “not new”, but represented “the most

immediate Iraqi threat”.

73.  Other key points in the Assessment are set out in the Box below.

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