The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
159.
Mr Douglas
Feith, the former US Under Secretary for Defense and
Policy,
recorded in
his memoir that he had been briefed by Ambassador Bremer
and
Mr Slocombe
on 9 May 2003 about “their plan to dissolve the Iraqi
Army”.126
160.
According
to Hard
Lessons, the US
Department of Defense (DoD) had not
discussed
the Order with senior officials from other US agencies before
approving it.127
Secretary Powell
recalled that “There was no meeting on it; there was no, ‘Gee, is
this
a good
idea?’ You couldn’t even tell who had decided it.”
161.
Major General
Tim Cross, a senior secondee to ORHA, told the Inquiry
that
the
decision to demobilise the army had been made “against all advice
from Garner
162.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary between 2001 and
2005,
told the
Inquiry:
“I was
not aware of any discussion with us, with the UK, before those
judgements
were taken.
After they were taken, the Americans said to us … that it had to
happen
anyway,
because the army had disappeared. Well, true, but not the 10,000
officers.
So I didn’t
quite buy that.”129
163.
Ambassador
Bremer had specifically raised the issue of “dissolving the MOD
and
the
security and intelligence organisations” and “establish[ing] a new
national army”
in his
first meeting with Mr Sawers on 12 May.130
Mr Sawers
had not expressed any
concerns
and commented that Ambassador Bremer had made a “good dynamic
start”.
164.
Mr Slocombe
met Mr Hoon in London on 13 May.131
Mr Slocombe
produced a
record of
this meeting for Ambassador Bremer (a leaked copy of which has
appeared
on the
internet), which stated:
“If some UK
officers or officials think we should try to rebuild and reassemble
the old
RA [regular
army] they did not give any hint of it …”
165.
The MOD record
of Mr Hoon’s meeting with Mr Slocombe on 13 May stated
that
Mr Slocombe
had:
“… outlined
… the plans for … the new Iraqi Armed Force. He emphasised that
this
would be a
new Army, rather than a reconstituted version of the
old.”132
126
Feith
DJ. War and
Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on
Terrorism.
HarperCollins, 2008.
127
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
128
Statement,
2009, page 25.
129
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 36.
130
Telegram 5
IraqRep to FCO London, 12 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Bremer’s First
Moves’.
131
BBC
News, 29
October 2007, In full:
Memo from Walt Slocombe to Bremer.
132
Minute
APS/Secretary of State [MOD] to Policy Director, 13 May 2003, ‘Call
on Defence Secretary
by Walt
Slocombe: 13 May 2003’.
96