The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• There had been “one uncorroborated report” that Iraq had “filled some artillery

rocket munitions with VX in the period 1996-1998, and another that a team of

chemists was formed in 1998 to produce 5 tons of VX. The source was told this

had been completed by the end of 1998”.

• Work on biological warfare programmes had “continued throughout the period

of UNSCOM inspections” and intelligence indicated “that this programme

continues. Key figures from the pre-Gulf War programme are reported to be

involved.”

• Research and development was “assessed to continue under cover of a number

of legitimate institutes and possibly in a number of covert facilities”.

• There was “no intelligence on any BW agent production facilities, but one

source indicates that Iraq may have developed mobile production facilities”.

The Assessment stated: “Though not corroborated, we judge the reporting is

technically credible. Imagery has yet to provide firm collateral but has identified

a number of sites that could be associated with this programme. The mobile

production facilities have yet to be identified.”

• The CIG did not know “which types of agent are produced by these facilities”.

• “A decision to begin CBW production would probably go undetected.”

• Iraq was “judged to be self-sufficient in the production of biological weapons”.

715. In the Key Judgements, the CIG stated that, while research and development

programmes continued, Iraq’s actual capabilities were finite. There was no intelligence

on the production of chemical and biological agents or weapons.

716. The JIC Assessment of 9 September 2002 judged that:

• “Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared

to use it.”

• “Iraq currently has available, either from pre Gulf War stocks or more recent

production, a number of biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW)

agents and weapons …”391

717. The Assessment stated:

“One intelligence report suggests that Iraq has ‘lost’ the capability to develop

warheads capable of disseminating chemical and biological agent and that it

would take six months to overcome the ‘technical difficulties’”.

391 JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons –

Possible Scenarios’.

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