The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… we will
need to decide whether we wish to influence US planning in
developing
any
northern option. This may well be necessary sooner rather than
later.”223
547.
The MOD has
been unable to provide any record of the meeting on 21
August.224
548.
On 27 August,
Dr Cholerton sent Mr Hoon an update on
Iraq‑related
developments,
including the potential impact of Op FRESCO.225
549.
Dr Cholerton
reviewed recent political and diplomatic developments and
its
understanding
of US planning, including that:
“Operations
in Northern Iraq are increasingly seen by the US planners as
highly
desirable
and an important addition to the campaign plan. The
overwhelming
effect of
simultaneous action against Saddam is one of the principal features
of the
campaign
design. It is increasingly accepted that action in the North would
play
an important
part in that; adding a significant additional complication he will
have
to overcome.”
550.
In relation to
the UK’s ability to deploy forces while supporting Op
FRESCO,
Dr Cholerton
advised that “a more refined set of force packages”, which would be
“more
flexible in
composition” was being developed; and that the position was
“significantly
better”
than the MOD had reported to No.10 on 26 July. Further work had
shown it would
be possible
to produce Package 2 if a firefighters’ strike lasted no longer
than three
months.
That package could include substantial maritime and air
capabilities and Special
Forces. The
ability to deploy a Royal Marine Commando Group after October 2002
was
included in
an Annex showing an “illustrative” Package 3.
551.
If
negotiations with the Fire Brigades Union broke down and a decision
was taken
to begin
full‑scale training for Op FRESCO, it would not be possible to
deploy a division,
but it
would be possible to release forces for a single brigade tailored
to operational
needs. That
would fall well short of the contribution required to enable the UK
to carry
out a
“discrete” role in the North.
552.
A smaller
contribution could raise “some of the integration issues which led
the
Chiefs of
Staff to view our offering conventional land forces for operations
in southern
Iraq as
impractical”. The UK would, however, continue to “explore ideas of
how such
a
contribution could be made to work alongside other potential
partners and drawing
heavily on
US goodwill and resources”.
553.
There were
suspicions that US planners continued to believe that the UK
could
deliver a
division if it were supported by the US, although there were
“signs” that it was
“looking at
the provision of US forces” if the UK could not provide a division.
A draft
223
Minute VCDS
to ACDS(Ops), 22 August 2002, ‘Iraq Planning – US Briefing to
Turks’.
224
Letter MOD
Iraq Inquiry Unit to Iraq Inquiry Secretariat, 1 November 2012,
[untitled].
225
Minute
Cholerton to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 27 August 2002,
‘Iraq’.
258