The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
896.
Mr Straw
raised the issue with Mr Jabr in the margins of the Iraq
Conference
in Brussels
on 22 June.855
Mr Jabr
agreed with the importance of investigating the
case and
said that a team had already travelled to Basra to do so. He said
that “the
problem was
that the policemen responsible had been appointed well before
he
assumed
office”.
897.
On 4 July,
Mr Innes emailed Mr Paul Fox, Head of IPU, to report that
the PIU had
been
disbanded and the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) purged.
Around 290 of
the 560
officers from the PIU and the DIA had been transferred to the new
Criminal
Intelligence
Unit (CIU), a unit established a few weeks earlier as part of an
MOI project
to
establish an “FBI style organisation” with branches around the
country.
898.
Mr Innes
raised further concerns that the former head of the DIA, who had
been
sacked in
January, had been appointed by the MOI to command the
CIU.856
Mr Innes
summarised:
“So, where
does all that leave us? I think we can take a good deal of credit
for
provoking
the dismemberment of the PIU and the DIA. The old rings have
been
broken, and
the practice of systemic abuse has been disrupted. There has been
a
real
shake‑up in personnel and command. According to intelligence and
eye‑witness
reports,
the Jameat has indeed turned over a new leaf … The fact remains
however
that bad
men are still at large; of the three officers we named in our
earlier lobbying
of MOI, two
are now in the new CIU and the third … is still in the DIA. We
will
continue to
urge their arrest, investigation, and prosecution – though we
need
to accept
that the political and tribal constraints on this actually
happening are
considerable.
Their sacking from the IPS would at least send an important
signal,
and we may
have to settle for that.”
899.
On 17 July,
DCC Smith reported that the PIU’s closure had left 100
incomplete
cases that
were now being reviewed by the Serious Crimes Unit
(SCU).857
There
was
also the
release of a number of detainees because there was “no evidence
against them
in the case
files”. A Ministry of Health team had visited the Jameat on 13 July
to carry
out medical
checks on all detainees and a routine of daily visits had been put
in place.
900.
DCC Smith
wrote that details about the CIU’s structure were “conflicting”
but
it appeared
to have “approximately 350 staff”. It was directed from Baghdad to
act
as an
intelligence‑gathering agency without powers to make arrests,
though DCC
Smith
observed that this direction was unlikely to be followed. He
commented that
“the
Governor and Chief of Police currently refuse to work with the CIU
and their
remit and
responsibilities are unclear”. A former head of the CIU had made
“currently
unsubstantiated
allegations” that the CIU was being funded by officers
taking
855
Email
Siddiq to Patey, 22 June 2005, ‘The Foreign Secretary’s Discussion
with Iraqi Interior Minister,
22 June
2005’.
856
Email Innes
to FCO [junior official], 4 July 2005, ‘Basra:
Police’.
857
Minute
Smith, ‘Weekly Report – Week Ending Sunday 17th July
2005’.
260