The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Diyala. “One MEK camp is located north of Baqubah; the current status of the

camp is unknown. There is liable to be a degree of Iranian influence due to the

proximity of the border, but Shia does not dominate the ethnic mixture in this

region, thus any influence exerted by the Iranians will be limited. It is assessed

that there is no discernible residual threat to Coalition Forces … Medium level

of consent.”

637.  The Chiefs of Staff discussed the UK AOR on 15 April.366 Lt Gen Pigott stated

that it was anticipated that the UK would be asked to administer Basra and Maysan

provinces, “together with two-star supervision of two further provinces, probably Wasit

and Dhi Qar or Diyala”.

638.  Adm Boyce concluded that: “The potential requirement for the UK commitment

to extend to four provinces needed urgent clarification.”

639.  Sir David Manning was informed that, on the basis of emerging levels of

consent, the Chiefs of Staff believed that a divisional headquarters and a brigade

of four battlegroups could look after Basra and Maysan provinces and, subject

to Coalition support, supervise two additional provinces.

640.  Mr Bowen summarised the discussion for Sir David Manning:

“The general idea is to provide a divisional headquarters and a brigade (of four

battlegroups). On the basis of the emerging level of consent in southern Iraq, they

believe that this brigade could look after, in security terms, the provinces of Basra

and Maysan. The divisional headquarters would enable the British to supervise two

additional provinces, provided two brigades’ worth of troops (and two headquarters)

were made available by either the Americans or other Coalition partners …

“There was some debate about which other provinces it was reasonable to assume

security responsibility for … There was concern that the civilian boundaries of ORHA

might not coincide with those of the military structure … Some of this will become

clearer after Mr Hoon speaks to Mr Rumsfeld today.” 367

641.  The speaking note prepared for Mr Hoon’s conversation with Secretary Rumsfeld

suggested that Mr Hoon state:

“• We [the UK] are assuming that we will reduce to a Divisional HQ and one

brigade in Iraq by July/August, if possible. Very difficult to imagine we could

offer more.

• We need clear understanding of envisaged requirement for July and beyond –

not just troop numbers, but what is the task and the concept? How many

provinces do you want us to cover?” 368

366  Minutes, 15 April 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

367  Minute Bowen to Manning, 15 April 2003, ‘Chiefs of Staff Meeting: 15 April’.

368  Paper MOD, 14 April 2003, ‘Phone Call with Donald Rumsfeld: Phase 4’.

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