The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
497.
Sir David
advised that, despite his prodding, the UK did not know
what
President Bush
would say in his speech on 12 September. Mr Blair might
have
to speak to
President Bush again “to try to hold him to the Camp David
conclusions”.
498.
Sir David
subsequently informed Dr Rice that Mr Blair’s position
was that
Iraq must
be made a challenge to the whole international community through a
UN
resolution
which required intrusive inspections; that they were an
indispensable
part of the
strategy; and that if the UN route was proposed with real
conviction,
support
could be secured.
499.
Sir David
spoke again to Dr Rice on the evening of 10 September
conveying
Mr Blair’s:
“… very
strong view that we must make Iraq a challenge to the whole
international
community.
We must do so through a UN resolution that … provided for an
intrusive
inspection
regime. The inspectors were an indispensable part of the
strategy.
Saddam
would either refuse to let the inspectors back, or he would let
them in
but almost
certainly obstruct their operations. We should then be in a very
strong
position to
insist on action. You [Mr Blair] believed that we should deal
with Iraq step
by step. We
needed to get this resolution under our belt, put the onus squarely
on
Saddam, and
then decide what to do in the light of his
reaction.”154
500.
Sir David
added that it was “essential” that a resolution was put
forward:
“… with
conviction and made it absolutely clear that we wanted it to
succeed.
We should
be emphasising at every turn that war was the last resort. The
US
Administration
would have the worst of both worlds if it appeared to have
been
forced
reluctantly to choose the UN route, or if it appeared to want a new
resolution
to serve as
nothing more than a pretext for early military
action.”
501.
Sir David
added that it was “increasingly” Mr Blair’s:
“…
impression that public opinion would come round if we proposed the
UN route
with real
conviction. If and when it became clear that Saddam had yet again
violated
the will of
the UN and the international community, there was a real chance
that we
could build
wide support for further action. But if we failed to do this, and
it appeared
that
Washington wanted to go the unilateral route, the international
community would
be
resistant or hostile to action. Securing wide support would be a
great prize, one
that you
[Mr Blair] believed was in reach.”
154
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with Condi Rice’.
178