14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
1092.
Mr Lyle
mentioned that options for replacing the Sea King being used for
Manned
Airborne
Surveillance in Iraq were also being considered.
1093.
On 26 October,
Lord Drayson and Mr Ingram wrote to Mr Browne with a
joint
proposal on
how to increase helicopter availability.579
Their
minute highlighted that
the issue
had arisen on “the assumption that there was a shortfall of lift
capability
in
Afghanistan” but there had been “very few occasions when tasks
could not be
supported”,
and theatre had not requested additional assets.
1094.
Despite that,
the Ministers said that the UK was “currently breaking crew
harmony
guidelines”,
and the current level of operations was unlikely to be sustainable
in the
medium term
so even if forces were not increased in Afghanistan, “action taken
now
will improve
the current situation”.
1095.
The measures
proposed by the Ministers included:
•
increasing
Chinook flying hours in Afghanistan;
•
procuring
new blades for Sea King Mk4s to enable them to fly in
Afghanistan
conditions;
•
procuring
six Danish Merlin to backfill the Sea Kings deployed in Iraq
and
Afghanistan;
and
•
“leasing/buying”
eight US Chinooks for Afghanistan.
1096.
Mr Browne
approved the increase in Chinook flying hours on 10
November,
agreeing
that the most likely requirement was for Afghanistan and for heavy
lift in
1097.
Mr Browne
wrote that more information was needed on the other
proposals
to clarify
how they would meet the capability gap in the short and medium
term.
Discussions
on the Danish Merlins should “slow down” until it was clear what
the
requirement
was and how it would be funded.
1098.
On 15
December, Brigadier James Everard, Commander 20 Armoured
Brigade,
wrote in
his post‑operation tour report:
“With the
exception of Merlin conducting IRT [Incident Response Team]
operations,
aviation
was not available between 1200‑1800 hours during this period.
The
availability
of the avn [aviation] fleet especially SK [Sea King] was poor,
largely due
to age, and
often affected operations meaning that the no‑fly contingency plan
had
frequently
to be activated.”581
579
Minute
APS/Min(AF) and APS1/Min(DP) to APS1/SofS [MOD], 26 October 2006,
‘Helicopters’.
580
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to APS/Min(AF) and APS1/Min(DP), 10 November 2006,
‘Helicopters’.
581
Report
Everard to PJHQ – J3, 15 December 2006, ‘HQ 20 Armd Bde Op TELIC 8
Post Operational
Tour Report’.
187