6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
out”,
Lord Boyce told the Inquiry he did not “recall … any
reluctance”; “it was just a
professional
judgement … an option which he could deliver”.390
981.
The
decision to offer ground forces (Package 3) to the US for
planning
purposes
was a significant step. Once the offer was made, it would have
been
difficult
to withdraw. This constrained the UK’s subsequent policy
choices.
982.
There is no
evidence that the extent to which the offer of Package 3
might
constrain
the UK’s future choices was a factor in Mr Blair’s
decision.
983.
The risks
associated with the decision, and with other options, were
not
examined by
senior Ministers in a collective discussion on the basis of
coherent
inter‑departmental
analysis and advice.
984.
The decision
to offer Package 2 – UK maritime and air forces, Special Forces
and
niche
capabilities – to the US for planning purposes in September 2002
was relatively
uncontroversial
and was not seen as exposing the UK to significant
risk.
985.
The offer of
significant forces for ground operations for planning purposes was
not
the same as
a decision to commit the forces to military operations, but it did
raise more
difficult
issues of both a practical and political nature.
986.
The advice for
Mr Hoon and Mr Blair in October 2002, however, did not
explicitly
address a
number of crucial strategic issues which had previously been
identified,
including:
•
the
implications of the mismatch between US and UK strategic
objectives;
•
the risk of
having to make a choice between the US and the UN route
because
of tension
between the US military timetable and that for UN
inspections;
•
the degree
to which offering Package 3 and deeper engagement in US
planning
might
constrain future choices more than the offer of Packages 1 and 2;
and
•
the
potential damage to the UK/US relationship if the UK subsequently
decided
it would
not participate in military action.
987.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit had set out his concerns in his minute to Mr Hoon of 3
July and his
letter to
Sir David Manning of 19 July.
988.
The issues had
also been identified in the papers prepared for the Chiefs of
Staff.
989.
While it would
theoretically have been open to the UK to withdraw the offer at
any
time, the
Chiefs of Staff themselves considered, on 9 October, that a UK
withdrawal
390
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 48‑49.
323