10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
164.
ORHA and the
Coalition might enjoy a “brief honeymoon”, but not if the
Coalition
seemed set
on administering Iraq for more than a brief period. It was
therefore
necessary
to put in place interim arrangements for post-conflict
administration that would
be accepted
by the Iraqi people and the Arab and Islamic world.
165.
A resolution
would be required to authorise those interim arrangements, and
to
provide a
legal basis for “reconstruction and reform”:
“Without a
UNSCR, other countries, international organisations, the IFIs,
UN
agencies
and NGOs will be comparatively limited in what they can do … That
would
leave US/UK
with no viable exit strategy from Iraq and a huge
bill.”
166.
The IPU
negotiating brief stated that the task for Camp David was to build
on five
areas where
there was already agreement between the UK and US:
•
The
Coalition, through ORHA, would be responsible for the
administration of Iraq
for the
first few weeks.
•
The UN
should not be asked to run Iraq.
•
The
objective should be Security Council authorisation or endorsement
for an
international
presence that would include the UN.
•
Coalition,
not UN troops would provide security on the ground.
•
As soon as
possible, Iraq should govern itself.
167.
The IPU stated
that differences between the UK and US positions
remained
significant.
The IPU explained that the US approach amounted to:
“… asking
the UNSC to endorse Coalition military control over Iraq’s
transitional
administration,
its representative institutions and its revenues until such time as
a
fully-fledged
Iraqi government is ready to take over. It would marginalise the
role of
a UN
Special Co-ordinator. These ideas are a non-starter for the
Security Council,
would be
denounced by the Iraqis and the wider Arab/Islamic world, and would
not
provide the
stability needed to develop the new Iraq.”
168.
The IPU stated
that there was “still some distance to go if we are to agree a
way
forward to
avoid an inchoate start to Phase IV”.
169.
The IPU set
out a number of “propositions” which it hoped Mr Blair and
President
Bush could
agree. Those propositions and the progress of the negotiations on
resolution
1483 are
addressed in Section 9.1.
31