The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
35.
Mr Julian
Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff from September 2001 to
November
2003, told
the Inquiry that the reporting on mobile laboratories, which had
been received
“through
liaison channels”:
“… appeared
to tie in with some understandings that the British experts had
of
previous
interest in use of mobile facilities. So it wasn’t seen as being
inherently
36.
As part of
the inter-departmental review of policy on Iraq in late 2000, the
JIC
judged
that:
•
It was
likely that Iraq had a limited residual WMD and prohibited
long-
range
missile capability.
•
Since the
departure of inspectors, the pace and scope of Iraq’s
missile
research
and development programme had increased.
•
Without
sanctions and UN monitoring, Iraq would accelerate its WMD
and
missile
programmes.
37.
A JIC
Assessment of the prospects for Iraq co-operating with resolution
1284 (1999)
on 1
November 2000, judged that Saddam Hussein’s “ambitions to rebuild …
weapons
of mass
destruction programmes” would “make him hostile to intrusive
inspections or
any other
constraints likely to be effective”.13
38.
In December
2000, at the request of the Cabinet Office Overseas and
Defence
Secretariat
(OD Sec), the JIC produced an Assessment of Iraq’s capability
to threaten its
neighbours
with conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction, and an
analysis
of how
changes in the sanctions regime might affect those judgements, to
inform the
inter‑departmental
policy review on Iraq.14
39.
The review of
policy on Iraq, which began in 2000 and was intended to
inform
discussions
with the new US Administration, is addressed in Section
1.2.
40.
In its Key
Judgements on WMD, the JIC stated:
“•
Iraq has
probably concealed a handful of
650km range ballistic missiles that
could reach
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and even Israel, as well as some
chemical
and biological
agent. But even if
Saddam Hussein has such weapons, he is
unlikely to
use them except in
extremis, in order to preserve his regime or as a
final
gesture of defiance.
•
Without
economic sanctions but with effective UN monitoring, Iraq
could
develop though
not produce longer range missiles. Although its
ability
12
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 16.
13
JIC
Assessment, 1 November 2000, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Co-operation with
UNSCR 1284’.
14
JIC
Assessment, 1 December 2000, ‘Iraq’s Military
Capabilities’.
16