The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
were
gradually unravelling increasingly took hold internationally. The
Oil-for-Food
programme
also attracted greater criticism because of the loopholes and
corruption
which
surrounded the handling of the programme in Iraq. And the Security
Council
849.
Sir Jeremy
also wrote that UNMOVIC had stronger investigative powers
than
UNSCOM and
that the abstentions had diminished the political force of the
resolution.
850.
Mr Tom
McKane, Principal Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary from
1997
to 1999 and
subsequently the Deputy Head of the Overseas and Defence
Secretariat
in the
Cabinet Office from 1999 to 2002, told the Inquiry that the
resolution was:
“… designed
to make progress on controlling Iraq’s WMD while at the same
time
alleviating
the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people by lifting the ceiling
on Iraq’s
oil exports
under the Oil-for-Food programme”.325
851.
Mr McKane
subsequently told the Inquiry that, after resolution 1284 until the
spring
of 2001,
there was a sense that Iraq was in “a more manageable state” and
“didn’t need
urgent
day-to-day attention”.326
852.
The UK’s
short-term objective in 1999 had been “an agreed Security
Council
approach on
the way forward, allowing us to draw a line under the differences
which
developed
over Operation Desert Fox”.327
853.
Although
resolution 1284 was a step forward for the Security Council and a
hard-
won
compromise, it did not bridge the gap between opposing
viewpoints.
324
Statement,
November 2009, page 2.
325
Statement,
8 December 2010, page 2.
326
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, pages 26-27.
327
Letter
Goulty to McKane, 20 October 2000, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper FCO,
‘Iraq: Future Strategy’.
186