The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1167. From late 2007 onwards the security situation across Iraq improved, as detailed in

Section 9.6. Alongside that reduction in threat, ISF capability began to grow, as judged

by the JIC in its 20 December Assessment.1099 Although it reiterated previous concerns

about the MOI and the ISF, it judged:

“… the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are in a much better position than six months

ago, partly because of an overall improvement in capability and partly because of

a reduction in threat. The prospects for them being able to successfully manage

security outside Baghdad, without MNF ground support, by the end of 2008 will

continue to be patchy across Iraq and depend heavily on progress being made on

national reconciliation and the maintenance of MNF‑led security gains. Neither is

guaranteed.”

1168. On 5 June 2008, the JIC judged that the ISF were “much better placed to manage

security through 2008”.1100 On Prime Minister Maliki’s influence on the ISF, the JIC wrote:

“In the last year he has been increasingly dictating where, when and how Iraqi

Security Forces (ISF) are deployed. Security policy decisions more widely are

increasingly being taken without reference to the coalition …

“We assess that Maliki maintains a firm grip on decision making within Iraq’s security

Ministries. He has further increased his personal control of ISF …

“We judge that in most cases this greater autocracy has increased overall ISF

cohesiveness and responsiveness.”

1169. On 10 September, the JIC assessed the future of JAM:

“… military pressure and Sadr’s order for his followers to avoid further conflict with

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in March forced JAM to surrender its control of the streets

in large parts of Basra, Baghdad and Al Amara. ISF now dominate the vast majority

of these areas, in many cases for the first time in years.”1101

1170. On 18 December, the JIC described the Iraqi Army as “an increasingly effective

force at all levels”, with the National Police approaching a similar capability.1102 However,

despite general improvements, the JIC judged:

“… local police remain ineffective, due to a lack of resources, militia infiltration and

corruption. Law enforcement is also undermined by an overstretched and under

performing judiciary. These weaknesses will inhibit the normalisation of Iraqi society

and real stability for years to come.”

1099 JIC Assessment, 20 December 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Two Steps Forward’.

1100 JIC Assessment, 5 June 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: More Able, Less Challenged’.

1101 JIC Assessment, 10 September 2008, ‘Iraq: the Future of Jaysh al‑Mahdi’.

1102 JIC Assessment, 18 December 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Mixed Abilities’.

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