3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
496.
Sir David
suggested that, subject to advice from Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the
UK
might
“spell out, either in the resolution or orally … that full
compliance includes:
•
explaining
satisfactorily what happened to all the BW and CW
unaccounted
for when
UNSCOM were forced out of Iraq in 1998;
•
full and
unfettered access to, and co-operation from […] who were
allegedly
involved in
the destruction of Iraq’s chemical stocks;
•
full and
unfettered access to, and co-operation from, all scientists
UNMOVIC
wished to
interview both inside and outside Iraq, as provided for
in
UNSCR 1441.”
497.
Sir David
added that those “conditions set the bar too high for compliance,
yet are
fundamental
to it”. Dr Blix would “find it hard to pretend otherwise,
whatever marginal
improvements
Saddam may go on making on process as opposed to
substance”.
498.
In tabling the
resolution, the UK:
“… should
emphasise that we are giving the French the extra time they want;
and
we are
taking Blix at his word … ‘inspections could still be short if
immediate, active
and
unconditional co-operation … were to be forthcoming’.”
499.
Sir David
identified a number of disadvantages:
“•
The
Americans will dislike it. As usual they are in a hurry. But the
military
timetable
can be adjusted if necessary. It would probably mean action in the
last
few days of
March i.e. after a vote on the second resolution on 15 March
and
a further
10 days for the Arabs to press Saddam to leave.
•
Blix will
dislike having to make a categoric judgement … We must draft
the
resolution
so that he cannot equivocate and cannot honestly give a
verdict
of full
compliance.
•
The French
… will work to block it. Their game is to string things
out
indefinitely …”
500.
Sir David also
identified the advantages:
“•
It gives us
another month to find our secure nine votes. We can claim that
we
have been
reasonable; four months on from 1441 no-one should
seriously
argue that
it is impossible to tell if Saddam is complying. A deadline will
also
focus minds
…
•
We have
another four weeks in which the inspectors just might get
lucky.
A real find
would have a major impact on Security Council opinion
…
•
It will
give Saddam four more weeks to make a mistake. He may do so,
perhaps
reacting
badly if Blix announces later this week that the Iraqis must
destroy their
Al Samoud 2
missiles with their costly engines. If Saddam refuses to
co-operate,
it will be
a glaring example of Iraqi non-compliance.”
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