4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
534.
In his press
conference on 25 July, Mr Blair was asked a number of
questions
about the
policy on Iraq (see Section 3.3).234
Asked why
the promised dossier laying out
the
evidence against Saddam Hussein had not appeared, Mr Blair
stated that it would be
published
when he judged it to be the right moment.
535.
The
ingrained belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained
chemical
and
biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if
possible
enhance its
capabilities, including at some point in the future a
nuclear
capability,
and was pursuing an active policy of deception and concealment,
had
underpinned
UK policy towards Iraq since the Gulf Conflict ended in
1991.
536.
While the
detail of individual JIC Assessments on Iraq varied, this
core
construct
remained in place.
537.
Security
Council resolutions adopted since 1991, demanded
Iraq’s
disarmament
and the re-admission of inspectors, and imposed sanctions in
the
absence of
Iraqi compliance with those – and other – obligations. Agreement
to
those
resolutions indicated that doubts about whether Iraq had disarmed
were
widely
shared.
538.
In
parallel, by 2000, the wider risk of proliferation was regarded as
a major
threat.
There was heightened concern about:
•
the danger
of proliferation, particularly that countries of concern
might
obtain
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; and
•
the
potential risk that terrorist groups which were willing to use
them
might gain
access to chemical and biological agents and, possibly,
nuclear
material,
and the means to deliver them.
539.
These
concerns were reinforced after 9/11.
540.
The view
conveyed in JIC Assessments between December 2000 and
March 2002
was that, despite the considerable achievements of UNSCOM
and
the IAEA
between 1991 and December 1998, including dismantling Iraq’s
nuclear
programme,
the inspectors had been unable to account for some of the
ballistic
missiles
and chemical and biological weapons and material produced by Iraq;
and
that it
had:
•
not totally
destroyed all its stockpile of chemical and biological
weapons;
•
retained up
to 360 tonnes of chemical agents and precursor
chemicals
and growth
media which would allow it to produce more chemical
and
biological
agents;
234
The
National Archives, Prime
Minister’s Press Conference, 25 July 2002.
109