6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
128.
In preparation
for Mr Blair’s meeting, Mr Bowen advised Mr Hoon
that Adm Boyce
had
directed that UK planning should concentrate on two
packages:
•
a
supporting/enabling package, including basing, maritime and air
assets, in
which the
“the only land contribution would be Special Forces”;
and
•
a discrete
land contribution of a division (minus) for operations in northern
Iraq.61
129.
Mr Bowen
wrote that:
“Other
options, such as providing land forces to integrate with the US
main effort
in the
south have been discounted because [sic] the severe difficulties we
would
face due to
interoperability, deployment time and geographic constraints
affecting
logistics
in particular.”
130.
Mr Bowen
provided “schematic timelines” showing decision dates and
readiness
which could
be achieved.
131.
Commenting on
Mr Bowen’s advice, Mr Watkins wrote that a division
(minus)
option
“would require immediate action on UORs etc and early decisions
(October) on
reserves”.62
The latter
would “definitely be visible”.
132.
Separate
advice from Lt Gen Pigott to Adm Boyce stated that one of
the issues
to be
covered in the “way forward” was that it should be agreed to
implement “invisible”
UORs now,
and to be prepared to advise Ministers later on visible
UORs.63
133.
A record of
the meeting on 23 July stated that Mr Hoon advised
Mr Blair that, if he
wanted UK
military involvement, Mr Blair “would need to decide this
early”.64
134.
The meeting
concluded that work should proceed on the assumption that the
UK
would
participate in any military action. Adm Boyce was to tell the
US military that “we
were
considering a range of options”.
135.
Mr Blair
stated that he would “revert on the question of whether funds could
be
spent on
preparation for this operation”.
136.
The MOD
identified three possible options for a UK contribution on
26 July
but no
recommendation was made about which option should be selected.
The
largest
option comprised the deployment of a division but the MOD was
also
examining
the possibility of deploying an additional light brigade and
providing
the
framework for a UK-led Corps headquarters.
61
Minute
Bowen to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq:
Meeting with the Prime Minister’.
62
Manuscript
comment Watkins on Minute Bowen to PS/Secretary of State [MOD],
22 July 2002,
‘Iraq: Meeting
with the Prime Minister’.
63
Minute
DCDS(C) to DPSO/CDS, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Update on Key
Issues’.
64
Letter
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting, 23 July’.
21