10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

829. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush by video conference on 6 November, he

commented that the question was “how quickly could we move to elections”.464 Mr Blair

thought the quicker the better, “but both the Iraqis and we needed to be able to handle it”.

830. Mr Blair commented that “with progress on infrastructure etc, we were now down

to a specific problem of how to deal with a small group of terrorists”. Mr Blair suggested

that some Sunni were “desperate to be on our side” and that infrastructure projects that

would benefit the Sunni community should be completed.

831. Mr Richmond attended a meeting with Ambassador Bremer, General John Abizaid,

Commander US Central Command (CENTCOM), and Gen Sanchez to discuss

“Sunni strategy” the following day.465

832. At Ambassador Bremer’s request, Mr Richmond summarised the CPA’s work

so far. Sunnis felt economically and politically excluded. The CPA was seeking to

address this by allocating more money for job creation and quick impact projects, and

by stepping up recruitment efforts for the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC), police and

army in Sunni communities. There were “no quick fixes”. The CPA had to reassure Sunni

communities that their interests would be safeguarded, but that was difficult without

clarity on the political and constitutional process.

833. Gen Abizaid agreed that there needed to be a long-term strategy, but said that

he was more concerned with “the next few weeks – how to prevent the insurgency

from growing”. He had met Sunni leaders in Mosul, and had come away with a

clear message: “jobs and money”. There also needed to be more flexibility on

de‑Ba’athification.

834. Gen Abizaid went on to outline the “tough” military plans to tackle the insurgency,

including in Fallujah. Mr Richmond warned that any military action had to be carefully

targeted; “a carrot and stick approach had to leave room for the carrot”.

835. The AHMGIR agreed on 6 November that officials should continue to oppose the

CPA’s privatisation policy.466

In mid-October, the CPA shared with the UK an early draft of an Order on Iraqi Ownership

Transformation, which covered the privatisation of Iraqi State-Owned Enterprises

(SOEs).467 The Inquiry has not seen a copy of that draft.

464 Letter Rycroft to Adams, 6 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Bush,

6 November’.

465 Telegram 258 IraqRep to FCO London, 9 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Sunni Strategy Meeting with Bremer

and Abizaid’.

466 Minutes, 6 November 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

467 Telegram 108 FCO London to IraqRep, 24 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Privatisation Order’.

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