The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
92.
In his memoir,
Mr Annan recounted the exchanges during that lunch in some
detail,
commenting
that it captured:
“… as few
other moments do in that year of extraordinary drama and
diplomatic
maneuvering
[sic], the depth of passions, and the way in which the question of
Iraq
became
about something far larger: the foundations of peace and security,
and the
place of
the United Nations as the sole legitimate authority to endorse the
use of
force
except in cases of self-defense.”24
93.
Sir
Christopher Meyer, British Ambassador to the US, reported that
the
US Administration:
•
was
satisfied with the impact of Secretary Powell’s
presentation;
•
hoped that
it might help to capture the swing vote in the Security Council;
and
•
believed
that the session had shown that the US had gone the extra mile
along
94.
President Bush
had announced that the US would welcome and support a
new
resolution
“which made clear that the Security Council stood behind its
previous
demands”;
and that he had “repeated his resolve to lead a coalition of the
willing
if necessary
to disarm the Iraqi regime”.
95.
Sir
Christopher also reported that support for action was growing.
An NBC
poll
published
on 5 February showed that 60 percent of Americans supported
military
action in
Iraq, and the number of Americans who would strike without UN
support
had increased
from 29 percent in January to 37 percent.
96.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 6 February that if Iraq’s non-compliance
continued,
a fresh
resolution would be sought from the Security Council.
97.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet it should be possible to gain consensus on
such
a resolution.
98.
Cabinet
agreed that Ministers should actively make the case for
the
Government’s
position on Iraq.
99.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 6 February that “the Government’s policy on Iraq
was
on
track”.26
If the UN
inspectors continued to report Iraqi “non-compliance with
its
obligations”,
a fresh resolution would be sought from the Security Council. There
was
“mounting
impatience on the part of Arab countries” with Saddam Hussein and
their
opinion
would be “more favourable to military action if the US pushed the
Middle East
24 Annan,
K. Interventions:
A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane,
2012.
25
Telegram
174 Washington to FCO London, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: US
Thinking’.
26
Cabinet
Conclusions, 6 February 2003.
196