The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
711.
Each of the
Directives contained a paragraph on Prisoners of War and
detainees,
reminding
the recipient that they had a legal liability to acquaint
themselves with the
Geneva
Conventions and Protocols, and that they were responsible for
ensuring that
all members
of UK contingents and components complied with them. The Directive
also
referred to
the requirement that any handling of Prisoners of War and detainees
must
be
conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of JWP-1-10,
the Joint Warfare
Publication
on the handling of Prisoners of War.
712.
In addition to
the Directives issued to senior commanders, all personnel
deployed
were issued
with an aide memoire on the Law of Armed Conflict, setting out the
basic
rules of
the Law of Armed Conflict in simple language and in a portable form
so all
service
personnel could carry them on their person.258
713.
On 13
March, the MOD Legal Adviser sought Lord Goldsmith’s views
on
a draft
Targeting Directive.
714.
On 10 March,
Mr Hoon wrote to Lord Goldsmith with a draft of the
‘Disarming
Iraq’ paper
which underpinned the choice of military tasks in the Government’s
draft
715.
Mr Hoon also
provided a second paper on targeting considerations.
Potential
targets
were examined by category with a description of the intelligence
surrounding it,
its
military necessity, targeting considerations and a suggested level
to which authority
would be
delegated for decisions on attacks.
716.
Delegation was
based on an assessment of the likely civilian
casualties,
categorised
as:
“•
…
no civilian
structures within […] metres of aim point; casualty estimate:
LOW
[…].
•
…
assessment
of whether any civilian objects in weapon effect radius;
casualty
estimate:
LOW or MEDIUM […].
•
…
assessment
using attack specific data; civilian casualty estimate:
LOW;
MEDIUM or
HIGH […].”
717.
One category
was “Regime Leadership Targets”, including Presidential
Palaces,
and
comprised “secure facilities” from where regime leaders could
exercise command
and
control. The targets were designed to prevent Saddam Hussein from
governing Iraq
and deny
him command and control of the Iraqi Armed Forces, including use of
WMD.
258 Aide
Memoire on the Law of Armed Conflict JSP381, version extant in
September 2004 published by
the Baha
Mousa Inquiry.
259
Letter Hoon
to Goldsmith, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Targeting Policy’ attaching
Paper ‘Disarming Iraq’ and
Paper
‘Operation TELIC: Targeting Consideration’.
502