17 |
Civilian casualties
Military
Police (RMP) had begun investigations into 17 civilian fatalities
allegedly caused
90.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Hoon on 18 November to ask that the MOD examine
whether
it would be
viable to collate information on post‑conflict civilian casualties
inflicted
lawfully
and in accordance with the UK’s Rules of Engagement by UK forces
(and
other troop
contributors) in the UK’s Area of Responsibility.68
Mr Straw
recalled recent
media and
NGO reporting on the “allegedly high levels of civilian casualties
inflicted by
Coalition
forces” and the level of Parliamentary and public interest, and
continued:
“I
recognise fully the difficulties involved in compiling accurate
statistics about civilian
casualties,
particularly during combat operations. But I am concerned that
the
current
UK/US position – that ‘there is no reliable means of ascertaining
the number
of civilian
casualties, even in post‑conflict Iraq’ – leaves the field entirely
open to our
critics and
lets them set the agenda …
“We need to
find ways of countering the damaging perception that civilians are
being
killed
needlessly, and in large numbers, by Coalition
forces.”
91.
Mr Straw
referred to the work of IBC, which he described as having “some
credibility
(within the
sourcing limitations)”.
92.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office passed Mr Straw’s letter to PJHQ, asking for a
draft reply.69
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office commented that they had already asked PJHQ to
identify the
total
number of civilians killed by UK forces since the end of major
combat operations.
93.
PJHQ replied
to Mr Hoon’s Private Office on 25 November.70
It confirmed
that
assessment
reports (ASSESSREPs) recorded the detail of contacts and incidents
in
the UK’s
Area of Operations, including details of civilian “casualties or
deaths”. It would
take two
weeks to review all ASSESSREPs produced since 1 May 2003, to
determine
the number
of Iraqi civilian casualties. The number produced would not be
“definitive
or entirely
comprehensive”; ASSESSREPs would only cover incidents which
were
witnessed
by or involved UK forces.
“The
current line, that there is no reliable way of knowing how many
casualties there
have been …
was perfectly reasonable during the decisive combat phase of
Op
TELIC … as
long‑range attacks meant that there was no source on the ground
to
verify …
casualty numbers.
67
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 13
November 2003, column 433W.
68
Letter
Foreign Secretary to Defence Secretary, 18 November 2003, ‘Iraq:
Civilian Casualties’.
69
Minute
APS/Secretary to State [MOD] to PJHQ J9 Hd Pl/Ops, 18 November
2003, ‘Iraq – Civilian
Casualties’.
70
Minute PJHQ
J9 to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 25 November 2003, ‘OP TELIC:
Civilian Casualties’.
187