The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
235.
Mr McKane
described the 18 June discussion to Sir David Manning as
“preparatory
to military
talks with the US … at which Tony Pigott and Desmond Bowen [MOD
Director
General
Operational Policy (DG Op Pol)] would represent the UK” (see
Section 6.1).136
236.
The SPG paper
set out the desired end state for Iraq in two forms:
•
A UK text,
substantively unchanged from the version agreed by Mr Straw
and
Mr Hoon:
“A stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders,
co-operating
with the IC
[international community], no longer posing a threat to its
neighbours
or to
international security, and abiding by its international
obligations on WMD.”
•
A US
version derived from the CENTCOM Iraq plan: “maintenance of Iraq
as
a viable
nation state, disavowing the use of WMD but capable of
defending
its borders
and contributing to the counter balance of Iran”. The
SPG
paper
added that US was “determined to achieve a more
representative,
non‑tyrannical
government”.137
237.
The SPG stated
that the end state “cannot be achieved while the current
Iraqi
regime
remains in power. Consequently, regime change is a necessary step
and there
is no
point in pursuing any strategy that does not achieve
this.”
238.
The paper
listed a number of “military/strategic implications” of this
approach,
including:
“Post-conflict.
Need to acknowledge that there will be a post-conflict phase
with
an
associated commitment, manpower and finance bill. Depending on how
the
regime
change is achieved, and the form of the replacement, there is a
spectrum
of commitment
where the worst case is a long period with a large
bill.”
239.
The SPG judged
that domination of Iraq’s state institutions, security
organisations
and the
officer corps by Sunni Arabs, who constituted just 15 percent of
the population,
made the
country “potentially fundamentally unstable”. Iraq was held
together by the
strong
security apparatus. It would require considerable force to break
the security
structure,
but when that happened the regime would “shatter”.
240.
Three
possibilities for regime change were presented:
•
removal of
Saddam Hussein and key advisers, including his sons, to be
replaced
by a Sunni
strongman;
•
removal of
Saddam Hussein and “his wider security and governing regime” to
be
replaced by
an “International Presence coupled with a bridging process
leading
eventually
to a broad based coalition”; and
•
removal of
the entire Ba’athist regime to be replaced by a federated
state.
136
Minute
McKane to Manning, 18 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
137
Minute
Driver to PSO/CDS, 13 June 2002, ‘Supporting Paper for COS
Strategic Think Tank on Iraq –
18 June’
attaching Paper [SPG], 12 June 2002, [untitled].
154