9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
authority.
Once established, the interim authority will progressively assume
more
of the
functions of government. The third phase will then bring into being
a fully
representative
Iraqi government, once a new constitution has been approved,
as
a result of
elections which we hope could occur around a year after the start
of the
interim
authority.”
186.
Mr Blair went
on to describe the need for “intense diplomacy” to
rebuild
relationships
so that the international community was able to “work together for
a stable
and
prosperous Iraq and for a peaceful middle east”.
187.
President Bush
and Mr Blair spoke on the telephone on 14 April.94
In his report
of
their
conversation, Mr Cannon wrote that Mr Blair had advised proceeding
more slowly
on the
formation of the IIA and that this was now US policy.
188.
Mr Blair had
suggested that it might take a year to establish a “full
Iraqi
government”.
They discussed the approaching formal end of hostile action, and
that the
US was
awaiting legal advice on the implications of being an Occupying
Power.
189.
On 14 April,
Lieutenant General John Reith, Chief of Joint Operations, reported
to
the Chiefs
of Staff that:
“Rightly,
there is a degree of pressure from within Theatre to return those
forces no
longer
gainfully employed on Op TELIC as soon as possible. But, equally we
need to
ensure that
we leave in place the correct force composition for the medium term
with
an eye to
our longer term disposition and commitment to the
region.”95
190.
Lt Gen Reith
anticipated the drawdown happening between April and early
August,
by which
time he expected the campaign to have reached “some form of
‘steady-state’”.
He
explained that the intention was to draw down to nearer a medium
scale of effort –
a
divisional headquarters plus a brigade – by “autumn 2003”. That
would enable the
UK to take
on responsibility for the provinces of Basra and Maysan and,
subject to
the
availability of supporting troops from elsewhere within the
Coalition, a further two
provinces,
Dhi Qar and Wasit.
191.
Lt Gen Reith’s
detailed recommendations on the UK’s Area of
Responsibility
(AOR), and
its evolution, are described in Section 8.
192.
On 15 April,
Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair to propose a significant increase in
UK
support to
ORHA, as agreed by the AHMGIR on 11 April.96
In return,
the US should
commit to
transparency and joint decision-making.
94
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 14 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 14 April’.
95
Minute
Reith to SECCOS, 14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4: Roulement/Recovery of UK
Forces’ attaching
Paper CJO,
14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4 – Roulement/Recovery of UK Land
Forces’.
96
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 15 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Office for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance
(ORHA)’.
161