9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
786.
In addition,
Lt Gen Rollo reported that Gen Petraeus had suggested:
“…
political sensitivities over ground-holding responsibilities worked
both ways,
and that
Washington might also be sensitive to an apparent extension of
US
responsibilities
as allies departed … The debate therefore remains
open.”
787.
Maj Gen Binns
left MND(SE) on 12 February and was succeeded by
Major General
Barney White-Spunner.381
788.
Reflecting on
the progress made during the previous six months in his last
weekly
report, Maj
Gen Binns commented:
“It has
taken me six months to develop an understanding of the Economic
and
Political
Lines of Operation. I have learned to measure economic
redevelopment
in decades,
to be patient, to listen to, and take the advice of, specialists in
the
PRT, some
of whom have been in Iraq for more than three years. We should
stop
beating up
on DFID; those, like me initially, who talk of ‘windows of
opportunity’ and
‘economic
surges’ are misguided. Iraq is awash with money. The Iraqis need
help in
spending it
and overcoming corruption through good governance, which is
exactly
the
approach taken by our PRT. Of course we will continue to use CERPs
money
to buy
consent for military operations, but let us not pretend that this
is sustainable
development,
because on some occasions it is the reverse. In 10 years
time
Basrawis
will remember that the US Army Corps of Engineers built their
Children’s
Cancer
Hospital; they will probably have forgotten Operation
SINBAD.”
789.
In his formal
end of tour report, Maj Gen Binns wrote:
“The Consul
General was hugely agile in getting politics moving and the PRT
used
the
headroom created by improvements to the security situation to
re-engage …
Inter
Departmental co-operation in theatre is superb …”382
790.
Maj Gen Binns
wrote that negotiations with JAM were “more successful than
we
dared
imagine”. Although JAM remained capable of renewing hostilities,
there was now
“clear
daylight” between the mainstream and the Iranian-backed cells. As a
result of the
negotiations
“we now talk of how to stay, not when to leave”. He judged
that:
“The
reconciliation process was dynamic, and our key interlocutor was
prone
to
inconsistency. The situation was complicated by the failure of some
wholly to
appreciate
that we were negotiating with a potentially unstable force. So
trying
to apply
reason to his argument and, in particular, to his negotiating
position
imposed an
unrealistic constraint on our freedom of negotiation. I found it
hugely
frustrating
that I was not trusted with delegated authority. By the time we
worked up
a
submission the situation had changed. Decisions were taken in
London by those
least able
to keep track of events. Only agile negotiation by [government
officials
381
Minute
Binns to CJO, 7 February 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 07
February 2008’.
382
Minute
Binns to CJO, 12 February 2008, ‘Op TELIC – GOC 1 (UK) Armd Div
Post Operation Report’.
327