3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
81.
The
Assessment, issued on 18 September, considered whether the attacks
of
11
September changed the nature and scale of the terrorist threat to
the UK, and
its
potential vulnerability to major terrorist attack, and “the current
and immediately
foreseeable
threat in terms of the intention and capability of known terrorist
groups”.43
The
Assessment assumed that there would be “a continuation of the
current political
circumstances
in which the UK is closely identified with the US”.
82.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
•
The attacks
had “set a new benchmark for terrorist atrocity. The level
of
destruction
and the public impact are unprecedented.”
•
“Terrorists
seeking comparable impact may try to use chemical,
biological,
radiological
or nuclear devices …”
•
The
“potential scope for terrorist attacks” was “very wide”: “But in
order to
assess the
threat to the UK, we need to consider both the capabilities and
the
intentions
of the terrorist groups.”
•
“Only
Islamic extremists such as those who shared Usama Bin Laden’s
agenda
currently
have the motivation to pursue” attacks “with the deliberate aim
of
causing
maximum casualties”. The more closely the UK was identified with
the
US, “the
higher the potential threat” to UK interests “both here and
overseas”.
•
Major
attacks like those of 11 September required considerable planning
and
were
“therefore likely to remain relatively infrequent”.
83.
The
development of the JIC position on the risk of terrorists acquiring
and using
CBRN is
addressed in Section 4.
84.
On 20
September, Mr Blair advised President Bush to “take our time to
see
whether we
could build up the case against Iraq or other countries” before
acting.
85.
Mr Blair
attended a memorial service for British victims of the 9/11 attacks
on
the World
Trade Centre in New York on 20 September, and subsequently
travelled to
Washington
to meet President Bush.44
86.
In relation to
suggestions then circulating in the US that Iraq was behind the
9/11
attacks,
the record states that Mr Blair told President Bush there was no
doubt that
Saddam
Hussein was evil:
“But before
any action was taken against him, we would need to be very sure
indeed
that there
was compelling evidence. It would be best to deal with Afghanistan
initially
43
JIC
Assessment, 18 September 2001, ‘UK Vulnerability to Major Terrorist
Attack’. As a Director in the
Treasury
Public Services Directorate responsible for the Defence, Diplomacy
and Intelligence Team,
Ms Margaret
Aldred, the Secretary to the Inquiry, was present at the
discussion.
44
BBC
News, 21
September 2001, Blair
pledges solidarity with the US.
327