12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
The role of
the Multi‑National Force (MNF) was to continue building the
capability of
the ISF and
its institutions through a programme of recruitment, training,
equipping,
mentoring
and monitoring.
86.
During the CPA
era, the metric used to measure progress in relation to the ISF
had
been the
number of personnel on duty. Immediately after the transition, that
metric was
replaced by
“trained and equipped”52
personnel.
The net result was a 75 percent drop in
the totals
of force personnel attributed to the MOI from 181,297 “on duty”
personnel on
15 June to
47,255 “trained and equipped” personnel on 25 August.
87.
Shortly after
transition, Mr Straw advised the Ministerial Committee on
Defence and
Overseas
Policy (DOP) that the SSR objective for the following six months
should be
for the ISF
to be in control across much of the country. That was the basis on
which UK
troop
reductions would be feasible. DOP agreed. It is not clear how
Mr Straw reached
the
conclusion that that was a viable objective.
88.
By early
October, there was clear evidence that the SSR objective agreed by
DOP
was
unlikely to be achievable because:
•
The Basra
police chief was working with militants who were causing
disruption
in the
area.
•
There
remained significant capacity issues within key
ministries.
•
There was a
need for more focused IPS training in areas of operational
planning
and
intelligence.
•
Warnings
from theatre continued to stress that the focus on numbers
was
misplaced –
the morale and integrity of officers who had joined the
ISF
was
questionable and those issues needed to be addressed to deliver
the
capabilities
required.
89.
In November,
FCO officials informed Mr Straw that they were factoring
such
concerns
into their planning. They assessed that the two most serious
problems were
the
dysfunctional MOI and the lack of equipment, both of which were
being addressed
by
UK‑funded initiatives.
90.
It should have
been clear to Mr Straw and FCO officials, for whose
advice
Sir Michael
Jay was accountable, that the ISF were unlikely to be able to
provide
security
and that troop reductions based on the assumption that Iraqiisation
would be
successful
needed to be reconsidered.
91.
On 9 December,
despite evidence to the contrary, the FCO continued to advise
that,
by the
summer of 2005, the ISF could take the lead on security. It was
overly optimistic
of the FCO,
under Mr Straw’s leadership, to believe that would be the
case. That
over‑optimism
distorted consideration of when UK forces should be withdrawn from
Iraq.
52
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
431