The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
848.
On
28 September, Mr Ehrman sent Sir Nigel Sheinwald draft
“lines to take” on the
ISG
Comprehensive Report, excluding the section on illicit finance and
procurement,
which
Mr Duelfer was reported to be rewriting.474
849.
Mr Ehrman
proposed that the focus should be on the three themes he
had
identified
in earlier minutes:
“•
Saddam’s
strategic intent to reconstitute his WMD when sanctions were
lifted;
•
his
repeated breaches of Security Council resolutions, including
1441;
•
the ISG
conclusions on the progressive erosion of sanctions.”
“The lines
to take also seek to deal with the main point which many will make
(put
crudely ‘no
WMD’) – mainly by reference to Lord Butler’s conclusions. We will
be
asked: ‘Do
you endorse/accept the ISG Report?’ I recommend that we stick to
the
reference
back to Butler, whose conclusions were very close to the ISG’s, and
to the
fact that
the Government accepted these. We cannot go further because we do
not
accept
Duelfer’s conclusion on uranium and Niger, which is the opposite of
Butler’s.
Nor has
Duelfer in most cases made clear the full reasoning behind his
conclusions.”
851.
Mr Ehrman
sent a further update on 1 October, explaining that the
chapter on
procurement
was still being worked on.475
852.
Mr Anthony
Phillipson, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
sent
Mr Blair
a minute on developments later the same day.476
Formal
publication of the ISG
Comprehensive
Report would be at 1500 UK time on 6 October. The US
Government
would brief
the US press at 1900 UK time on 5 October. The FCO was leading
on UK
press
handling and intended to take “a low-key, defensive, approach”. It
was not a UK
report and
there would be no UK pre-briefing. Mr Straw would issue a
Written Statement.
853.
Mr Phillipson
wrote that Mr Blair would:
“… want to
discuss this on Monday [4 October], particularly if you want
to take a
more
proactive approach to get across the positive aspects of the Report
regarding
Saddam’s
strategic intent to develop WMD.”
854.
Mr Phillipson
added that the US had decided that there would be two
printed
versions of
the Comprehensive Report, not one:
•
a “not for
publication” version for Congress and the US Government;
and
•
an online
version with references to US companies and individuals excised
for
legal
reasons.
474
Minute
Ehrman to Sheinwald, 28 September 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group
(ISG) Report’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
[undated], ‘Duelfer’s Comprehensive Report: Lines to
Take’.
475
Minute
Ehrman to Sheinwald, 1 October 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
Report’.
476
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 1 October 2004, ‘ISG Report:
Publication’.
594