6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
an armoured
brigade, artillery and logistic support for an operation in the
North.392
That
was, “of
course, all subject to final political decisions here on recourse
to military action”.
Mr Hoon
asked to be alerted to any slippage in US military planning
timetables.
998.
Referring to
the potential difficulties with Turkey, Secretary Rumsfeld asked if
UK
forces
would be available for operations in the South. Mr Hoon
replied that the UK was
open to
ideas but had so far focused on the North because the US would have
plenty of
their own
forces in the South and space would be limited.
999.
Sir David
Manning flew to Washington on 31 October for talks with
Dr Rice,
Mr Colin
Powell, US Secretary of State, and Mr Armitage.
1000.
Sir David
advised Mr Blair that he had told Dr Rice that the UK
“continued to plan
for a
possible UK military role in northern Iraq, if the shooting
started”.393
1001.
Sir David
wrote that they had discussed:
•
Whether a
UK military force would be permitted to transit through
Turkey.
•
The fact
that “the UN inspection timetable was now out of sync with
the
timetable
for possible military action beginning in early January”. He had
asked
“whether we
might now be looking at the second of the original ‘windows’
ie
a campaign
next winter rather than this”. That had not been ruled out but
the
conversation
had shifted to the prospects for internal regime change sparing
the
need for
military action. The best chance of securing that was “a very tough
UN
resolution
accompanied by threatening military preparations, in the hope
that
Saddam’s
system would implode under the strain”.
1002.
Other issues
discussed, including Sir David’s suggestion of “a new wariness
at
the heart
of the [US] Administration”, are addressed in Section
3.5.
1003.
Mr Rycroft
reported a “strong impression” that the US expected
“Turkish
objections
to a UK military presence to be insistent and difficult to
overcome”. There had
been a
mixed response to the question of whether the US would be prepared
to expend
political
capital helping the UK.394
Mr Rycroft
added:
•
Mr Armitage
had told Sir David that the US would do “whatever is
necessary” to
get the UK
into Turkey.
•
Secretary
Powell had told Sir David Manning on 1 November that he
was
unsure
about Turkey’s real position and had “lots of military questions”
about the
northern
route.
392
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 31 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
393
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 3 November 2002, ‘Visit to Washington:
Talks with Condi Rice’.
394
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 1 November 2002, ‘Iraq: US views, 1
November’.
325