The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• “Iranian interdiction efforts” had “significantly reduced smuggling down

the Gulf”, but Saddam Hussein had “compensated by exploiting land routes

to Turkey and Syria”.

• “Most countries” believed that economic sanctions were “ineffective,

counterproductive and should now be lifted. Without active enforcement,

the economic sanctions regime” would “continue to erode”.8

33.  The Assessment also stated:

• Saddam Hussein needed funds “to maintain his military and security apparatus

and secure its loyalty”.

• Despite the availability of funds, Iraq had been slow to comply with UN

recommendations on food allocation. Saddam needed “the Iraqi people to

suffer to underpin his campaign against sanctions”.

• Encouraged by the success of Iraq’s border trade agreement with Turkey, “front-

line states” were “not enforcing sanctions”.

• There had been a “significant increase in the erosion of sanctions over the

past six months”.

34.  When Mr Blair had his first meeting with President Bush at Camp David in late

February 2001, the US and UK agreed on the need for a policy which was more widely

supported in the Middle East region.9 Mr Blair had concluded that public presentation

needed to be improved. He suggested that the approach should be presented as a

“deal” comprising four elements:

• do the right thing by the Iraqi people, with whom we have no quarrel;

• tighten weapons controls on Saddam Hussein;

• retain financial control on Saddam Hussein; and

• retain our ability to strike.

35.  The stated position of the UK Government in February 2001 was that containment

had been broadly successful.10

36.  During the summer of 2001, the UK had been exploring the way forward with the

US, Russia and France on a draft Security Council resolution to put in place a “smart

sanctions” regime.11 But there was no agreement on the way ahead between the UK, the

US, China, France and Russia, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

8 JIC Assessment, 14 February 2001, ‘Iraq: Economic Sanctions Eroding’.

9 Letter Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 24 February 2001, ‘Prime Minister’s Talks with President Bush,

Camp David, 23 February 2001’.

10 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 February 2001, column 620.

11 Minute McKane to Manning, 18 September 2001, ‘Iraq Stocktake’.

576