6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
agree that
“subject to the usual caveat that no political decision has been
taken
to commit
UK forces, US/UK planning should proceed on the assumption
that
the ATG
would undertake this role”.
1194.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit pointed out the need to identify the operational
risks.
1195.
When he saw
the advice, Sir Kevin Tebbit, who had not been present at
the
Chiefs of
Staff discussion on 11 December, wrote:
“What sort
of risk assessment is being prepared? I assume the S of S
[Mr Hoon] is
aware that
these would be lead elements in an operation where we are unlikely
to
have the
benefit of surprise or of choice of territory (I assume the Iraqis
will be aware
that this
is where we would have to go, more or less?) We need to make sure
that
the
operational risks are stated in a clear and balanced
way.”467
1196.
Details of
the proposal were sent to Mr Blair on 12
December.
The operational
risks were not explicitly addressed.
1197.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office wrote to No.10 on 12 December stating that the
maritime
contribution
set out in Mr Hoon’s letter of 15 October included an ATG; and
that “as
the US
military plan has developed, it is clear that there is an important
role for this
Group”.468
Mr Hoon
had “mentioned this” to Mr Blair on 11 December.
1198.
The MOD stated
that the ATG, and 40 Commando Group Royal Marines,
would
play a key
role “on Day 1 of offensive operations”, for
operations:
“… possibly
of high intensity and could bring forward the decisive
employment
of armoured
forces by up to 10 days. It also reduces the risk of destruction of
oil
infrastructure
and the associated environmental damage. It has strategic
and
operational
effect, and provides an opportunity for UK land involvement even
if
agreement
cannot be obtained from Turkey for the northern
option.”
1199.
Details of the
proposal, set out in an Annex to the letter, largely reflected
the
MOD’s
advice to Mr Hoon, but it did not address the likely Iraqi
defences.
1200.
Copies of the
letter were sent to the Private Office of Mr Straw and to
Mr Bowen
in the
Cabinet Office.
1201.
After the
Chiefs of Staff discussion on 18 December, Lt Gen Reith
was directed
to add HQ 3
Commando Brigade and a second Royal Marine Commando to
the
Amphibious
Task Group.469
467
Manuscript
comment Tebbit on Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11
December 2002,
‘Iraq
Military Planning: Amphibious Task Group’.
468
Letter
Williams to Manning, 12 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning –
Amphibious Task Group
(ATG)’.
469
Minute
Reith to CDS, 19 December 2002, ‘Land Options Paper – Revised’
attaching CJO Paper
‘Land Options
– Revised’.
355