12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
that
funding was not an issue and that problems with equipment had been
overcome.
Dr Rice
described police training as a “too many cooks” situation that
would be improved
by the new
centralised military command.
364.
In January
2004, the MOD deployed a Defence Advisory Team (DAT) to
scope
the
requirements for the new Iraqi Ministry of Defence
(IMOD).316
UK military
trainers
were also
working on the creation of the Iraqi Joint Forces HQ, to provide
command and
control of
the Iraqi Armed Forces.
365.
The DAT
reported its findings to Mr Webb on 30
January.317
It assessed
that:
“Sufficient
detailed progress has been made towards the achievement of an
IMOD
with an
initial operating capacity available from 1 May 04. Additional UK
staffing
assistance
is warranted in the context of both immediate needs and future
mentoring
and
implementation requirements … We find that a UK lead for an
empowered
mentoring
implementation project, to deliver the institutional development of
a fully
functional
MOD, would be appropriate.”
366.
The DAT
recommended that the UK provide immediate assistance in the areas
of
vetting and
public affairs, and consider a longer‑term role mentoring key
positions within
the IMOD.
The total mentoring requirement was expected to be around 17 staff,
of whom
five should
be MOD UK‑based civilians. The project was forecast to last two
years at a
cost of
£1.9m, rising to £3.65m if suitable mentors could not be found from
the public
service.
367.
In February
2004, Maj Gen Eikenberry produced an assessment of what
reforms
were
necessary to deliver enough capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to
take over
security
responsibilities.318
368.
The review
team, which travelled to Iraq in January 2004, consisted of 22
members
primarily
from the US authorities and included a UK colonel.319
369.
The key
findings of the review team were:
•
the need
for unity of command across the security sector (the military
were
to assume
overall command);
•
the need to
develop the capacity and capability of ISF (military and
police)
rapidly;
316 Annotated
Agenda, 8 January 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
317
Minute
Fuller to PS/Policy Director [MOD], 30 January 2004, ‘UK Support
for Establishment of Iraqi
Ministry of
Defence (IMOD): Defence Advisory Team (DAT) Final Report and
Recommendations’.
318
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
319
Paper
Clissitt, 1 February 2004, ‘Iraq Security Force Assessment Team
(ISFAT) Initial Findings:
Brief for OPCOS’;
Annotated Agenda, 7 January 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq
Rehabilitation meeting.
137