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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
The Government believes it important that we should divulge as much information
to the public as we can without prejudicing sensitive sources, including intelligence
reporting. It has been the practice of successive governments not to comment on
intelligence matters.”193
446.  In an interview with Mr David Frost on BBC Television’s Breakfast with Frost on
21 April, primarily about the Budget, Mr Blair was asked about the imminence of military
action against Iraq (see Section 3.3).194
447.  In response to a suggestion that the dossier on Iraq had been stopped because it
was out of date because there hadn’t been any decent intelligence for two or three years
or because it was insufficient to convince critics within the Labour Party, Mr Blair replied:
“… it wasn’t pulled … we will publish it at the appropriate time and when that’s going
to be I simply don’t know … The evidence of Saddam Hussein on weapons of mass
destruction is vast.
“… [W]hat we also know from our experience of September 11 that it’s sensible to try
to deal with these threats before they become fully operational rather than after.”
Development of the Iraq dossier, April to July 2002
Revision of the estimates of unaccounted for Iraqi material
448.  Revised estimates of material which UNSCOM had been unable to account
for when it left Iraq in December 1998 were published on 2 May.
449.  Mr Straw was advised that the figures were an extrapolation based on
UNSCOM data, but it was “inherently difficult to arrive at precise figures”.
450.  Mr Ricketts asked Mr Dowse on 22 March to “take forward work with the
Assessments Staff” on the new figures provided by the DIS for “Iraqi stocks of CW
precursors and munitions” which should, “if possible”, be the same as those being
used by the US.195 Ministers would then need to be advised:
“… how best to get them into the public domain before any comprehensive paper
is published: probably by inspired PQ as soon as Parliament re-assembles, making
clear that these are revised estimates.”
451.  Mr Dowse wrote to Mr Miller on 25 March “to sort out how we manage the DIS’
new calculations of unaccounted-for Iraqi CW precursors and munitions”.196
193  House of Commons, Official Report, 16 April 2002, columns 861-862W.
194  BBC News, 21 April 2002, BBC Breakfast with Frost Interview: Prime Minister Tony Blair.
195  Minute Ricketts to Patey, 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Preparing Material for Public Release’.
196  Letter Dowse to Miller, 25 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Material for Public Release’.
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