4.4 | The search for WMD

468. The ISC called on Mr Blair in Downing Street on 11 September, before the Report

was laid before Parliament.257 Mr John Prescott (Deputy Prime Minister), Mr Straw,

Sir David Omand, Mr Scarlett and Mr Powell were also present.

469. Mr Blair told the ISC that the ISG faced serious security constraints in Iraq, but its

disclosures could change the context of discussion of Iraqi WMD in the UK.

470. In the conclusions to its report, the ISC stated that:

• The September 2002 dossier had been “founded on the assessments then

available”.

• It was content that the JIC had “not been subjected to political pressures”.

The JIC’s independence and impartiality had “not been compromised in any

way”. The dossier had not been “sexed up”.

• Use of the phrase “continued to produce chemical and biological weapons” in

the foreword could have given the impression that Saddam Hussein had been

actively producing chemical and biological weapons and significant amounts of

agents. The dossier should have highlighted uncertainty about what had been

produced and in what quantities to give a balanced view of Saddam Hussein’s

chemical and biological capacity.

• The dossier should have highlighted that battlefield rather than strategic

weapons were the most likely chemical and biological munitions to be used

against Western forces.

• The dossier had been for public consumption, not experienced readers of

intelligence. It should have highlighted that the 45 minutes claim referred to

battlefield chemical and biological munitions, not to any other form of attack.

That omission had allowed speculation as to the exact meaning of the claim and

had been unhelpful to an understanding of the issue.

• The initial failure by the MOD to disclose that some staff had put their concerns

about the dossier in writing to their line managers was “unhelpful and potentially

misleading”.

• If individuals in the intelligence community wrote formally to their line managers

with concerns about JIC Assessments, those concerns should be brought to the

attention of the JIC Chairman.258

471. Sir David Omand recommended that the Government delay its formal response to

the ISC report until after the conclusion of the Hutton Inquiry, in line with the approach

taken with the FAC.259

257 Minute, Cannon to Prout, 11 September 2003, ‘Intelligence and Security Committee’.

258 Intelligence and Security Committee, September 2003, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction –

Intelligence and Assessments, Cm5972, paragraphs 106-116.

259 Letter Omand to Rycroft, 9 September 2003, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraq’.

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