3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
732.
The
subsequent discussion in the Council suggested that only the UK,
the
US and
Spain took the view that all options other than the use of military
force
had been
exhausted.
733.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had “highlighted the particular role
played by
France –
without naming her – in making agreement impossible”. Mr de
La Sablière
had said
shortly afterwards that the French position reflected the majority
view
in the
Council.
734.
In the
subsequent Council meeting, which Sir Jeremy Green stock
described
as a
“downbeat and rather surreal affair”, France Germany and Russia
continued to
push for an
open Council meeting at Ministerial level to consider and approve
the work
programme
for the inspectors.255
735.
Mr Lavrov
said the statement by France, Russia and Germany on 15 March
spoke
for itself:
“Inspections were actively under way and yielding results.” He
wanted to hear
more from
Dr Blix about recent steps by Iraq “on substance”. The Council
should meet
at
Ministerial level on 18 or 19 March to consider the work programme.
Russia “took a
different
approach based on the concrete facts that disarmament was
working”.
736.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had “regretted that it was not possible to find a
way
forward on
an ultimatum that would both put pressure on Iraq to take the
strategic
decision to
disarm and maintain inspections as the tool”; and stated that the
UK:
“… reserved
the right to take steps that would deliver disarmament. While
the
prospects
for peace were very slim, it was still possible even at this late
hour
for Saddam
to take a strategic decision and the actions that would prove
such
a decision.
In the circumstances, our national advice to UNMOVIC/IAEA and
UN
staff was
that it would be prudent to suspend inspections and for staff to
withdraw
immediately
… we remained interested in the 1284 work programme against
the
background
of the slim possibility of a strategic decision by
Iraq.”
737.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Ambassador Negroponte told the Council that,
given
the threat
of a veto, there had been no purpose in pursuing the resolution any
further.
The US had
warned UNMOVIC and the IAEA the previous evening that it would
be
necessary
to evacuate their personnel: “War was not imminent but it would not
be
possible to
give further notice.”
738.
Mr de La
Sablière was reported to have told the Council that:
“At a time
when inspections were making progress and peaceful disarmament
in
a limited
time seems possible his delegation had indeed made clear that it
would
oppose a
resolution authorising force. But it was not a veto when the
co-sponsors
did not
have a majority – it was a straight no. The situation was serious
but we
255
Telegram
464 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Resolution’.
529