10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
•
supporting
the handover of power to the new government, through
the
DFID‑funded
consultancy team;133
•
pressing
the UN, IMF and other donors to engage;
•
completing
the design of DFID’s new £40m power and infrastructure
programme
for the
South; and
•
deciding on
ways to expand visible job creation work in the South.
222.
ITG ownership
of governance and reconstruction would be crucial. The UK
would
strengthen
the ITG’s strategic communications capacity, to ensure that
successes were
promulgated.
223.
The strategy
also identified a number of economic priorities:
•
ensuring
the UK “plays its part” in achieving a “fair and sustainable”
solution to
Iraq’s debt
problems. Iraq would need to secure comparable debt relief
from
non-Paris
Club debtors;
•
encouraging
Iraq to complete its IMF programme;
•
continuing
to support economic reform;
•
promoting
an “efficient, outward looking and transparent” oil and energy
industry
and the
transparent management of Iraq’s oil reserves; and
•
advising on
an effective response to inflationary risks.
224.
The strategy
stated that the UK’s current posture in Iraq was costing
around
£1bn a
year, but did not comment on whether this amount was appropriate or
sufficient.
225.
In discussion,
Ministers commented that it was essential that the
security,
political
and reconstruction tracks were synchronised if the UK was to
achieve its
objectives
in Iraq.134
If
necessary, the UK should push ahead with plans for security
and
reconstruction
in MND(SE), in advance of developments in the rest of the
country.
226.
The Group
approved the strategy and agreed that No.10 should pass an
updated
version to
the US, raising the issue of diversion of US funding for
reconstruction projects
from the
South to other parts of the country.
227.
The Group also
agreed that Mr Blair and Mr Benn should press
Mr Annan and
Mr James
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, to deploy staff to
Basra.
228.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald sent a revised version of the strategy to Mr Stephen
Hadley,
US National
Security Advisor, on 11 February.135
133 A
reference to DFID’s £4.2m Emergency Public Administration
Programme, which was developed
to help
establish the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet and committee
system.
134
Minutes, 9
February 2005, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
135
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 11 February 2005, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper,
‘Iraq: Strategy for 2005’.
233