The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
929.
Gen Reith
told the Inquiry that he was not sure that it had been necessary
to
provide
significant numbers to secure influence. It was the UK’s “niche
capabilities” and
the quality
of the advice it provided to US commanders that gave the UK
influence.367
930.
The advice
to Mr Hoon and Mr Blair did not distinguish clearly
between a
desire and
ability to influence US military planning on the one hand and wider
and
more
strategic objectives on the other.
931.
There was a
perception that the UK would be able to influence, and
if
necessary
delay, the timing of the military campaign. That was initially seen
as
desirable
to give more time for inspections and the strategy of coercion to
work
and to
build domestic and international support for action.
932.
A later
timescale was also desirable if UK ground forces were to be ready
to
participate
in combat operations.
933.
The
argument that the UK would be unable to influence the conduct of
the
US military
campaign without a significant and active role in combat operations
is
self‑evidently
true. The key question is, however, whether the influence
achieved
was
commensurate with the scale of the UK contribution.
934.
The degree
to which the UK was able to influence the planning and
conduct
of the
military campaign is difficult to determine, as Section 8
states.
935.
The extent
to which the offer of Package 3 rather than Package 2 was
driven
by the view
that it would materially affect the UK’s ability to influence the
US at the
political
level, or that it would have a lasting impact on the strategic
relationship
between the
US and UK is debatable.
936.
Mr Blair
regarded the decision as a strategic choice for the UK. He told the
Inquiry:
“If you are
there with a bigger force alongside the Americans than otherwise,
then, of
course, you
will be more intimately involved, but that’s not really the
reason.”368
937.
Asked whether
he saw a correlation between the size of the UK contribution and
its
influence
with the US, Mr Jonathan Powell told the Inquiry that he did
not think that was
938.
Asked by the
Inquiry whether he thought offering Package 3 had been
essential,
Mr Powell
replied: “No”; the two reasons which had “militated in favour” of
that decision
were:
367
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, page 57.
368
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 62.
369
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, page 91.
316