The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In Lt Gen Lamb’s
view, that increase needed to be viewed in the light of the
increased
MNF and ISF
activity against the insurgents across Iraq as the US surge kicked
in.
918.
Meanwhile,
progress on reconciliation and engagement continued and Lt
Gen
Lamb saw “a
rising groundswell of activity at the GOI [Government of Iraq]
level” aimed
at
embracing the emerging opportunities.
919.
On 18 June,
Mr McDonald responded to the letter of 13 June from a
senior
government
official specialising in the Middle East (2), saying:
“Thank you
for your minute of 13 June. I was surprised to hear of this
initiative only
when it was
well advanced (ie about to start delivery). As you say, it has
major
political
implications.
“That said
– I think it right and reasonable for us to try (and be seen to be
trying) to
do
everything better to protect our forces. And I agree we should be
hard headed
about
possible rewards to [JAM1] (it is fortunate that two of the six
detainees he
wants are
already scheduled for release). Although we cannot expect
complete
quiet, we
need a measurable difference directly attributable to [JAM1]
before
proceeding
further.
“What were
the results of the (first) cease‑fire?”501
920.
In a summary
of the negotiations with JAM prepared in November 2007, a
senior
official
specialising in the Middle East (1) explained that early talks with
JAM1 had
focused
on:
“•
The release
of Basra detainees, which would help JAM1’s local
standing.
•
The
relationship between JAM and the Iranian‑backed Secret Cells. JAM1
was
adamant
that he could bring the Secret Cells into line with his policy.
MND(SE)
and
[government officials working closely with the military] insisted
on a broad
right to
self‑defence and the need to counter Iran.
•
The risks
of US intervention. [JAM1] feared a US takeover of MND(SE) and
the
transfer of
detainees to US custody.
•
The risks
of Shia against Shia political conflict. From the start [JAM1]
talked
of the
necessity of an accommodation with Badr, Fadilah and the other
Basra
parties. He
wanted Fadilah detainees released as well as JAM.
•
The need
for development work to continue. Although [JAM1] wanted the
military
occupation
to end as soon as possible, he requested an acceleration of
visible
development
work and later provided a list of priority projects to improve
quality
501
Note
McDonald to senior government official specialising in the Middle
East (2), 18 June 2007,
‘[JAM1]’.
502
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Lyall‑Grant, 9 November 2007,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: Negotiations with JAM in Basrah’.
172