The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The
objectives would also need to “evolve with changing
circumstances”.
Mr Bowen
stated that the paper was not intended for publication: if
Mr Blair was content,
Sir David
would “no doubt … arrange for it to be sent to DOP [Defence and
Overseas
Policy
Sub-Committee of Cabinet] colleagues” (see Section 2).
Mr Bowen’s
advice was also sent to Sir David Omand, Cabinet Office
Permanent
Secretary
and Security and Intelligence Co‑ordinator, Mr Scarlett, and
to officials in the
FCO, the
MOD and the Home Office.
Mr Ian
Lee, MOD, Director General Operational Policy, sent a copy of the
draft to
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office, commenting that while the text was “helpful” it did
not “go far
enough in
providing direction for current military activity and an
information strategy”.228
Mr Lee
did not expect the draft to move forward until there was a clear UN
position.
Pointing
out that there was “a good deal of contingency planning work going
on in
Whitehall
to support action in the United Nations on Iraq”, Sir David Manning
wrote on
22 October
to Mr McDonald and the Private Secretaries of DOP members to
inform them
that
Mr Blair had approved the objectives enclosed with his letter,
which “should help
guide work
in Departments for current phase of activity”.229
The letter
was also sent to the Private Secretaries to Mr David Blunkett
(the Home
Secretary),
Mr John Prescott and Mrs Margaret Beckett (the Environment,
Food and Rural
Affairs
Secretary).
The
objectives were unchanged from those proposed by Mr Bowen on 4
October.
The draft
objectives underpinned subsequent policy statements both to explain
the UK’s
position
and to maintain the pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with the
demands of
the
international community.
Mr Straw
formally announced the UK’s objectives on 7 January 2003 (see
Section 3.6).230
675.
A telegram
from the British Embassy Paris on 21 October, recorded that there
was
“universally
positive” coverage in the French media of President Chirac’s firm
stance on
Iraq,
including a threat of the “first use of France’s veto since Suez”
and suggestions that
he had
forced US concessions over a two‑step approach.231
The media
also reported
some
details of the textual negotiations.
676.
President
Chirac’s stance was cited as the main reason for the jump in
his
popularity
in the latest opinion poll from 52 percent in September to 57
percent.
President
Chirac was also given credit for the paragraph on Iraq in the
Francophone
Summit
conclusions “defending multilateralism, the primacy of
international law and
the pivotal
role of the UN”.
228
Minute Lee
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic
Policy Objectives’.
229
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper
Cabinet Office, ‘Iraq: Strategic
Policy
Objectives’.
230
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, columns 4‑6WS.
231
Telegram
609 Paris to FCO London, 21 October 2002, ‘Iraq: French views:
Chirac Riding High’.
320