10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
276.
Gen Riley
reported on 5 April that a fire had completely shut down the main
power
station in
Nasiriyah, which supplied 50 percent of the electricity to the
MND(SE) area.157
He
commented:
“This
simply serves to point up the fragility of the national supply and
to illustrate
that DFID
and MND(SE) alone are never going to solve the electricity
problem
in southern
Iraq. While I still believe that DFID’s US$10m will make a
small
difference
this summer the symbolic nature of the money is as important as
the
power it
will produce.”
277.
Gen Riley
concluded that “more drastic action” was needed to prevent an
even
bigger
problem in summer 2006.
278.
DFID had
published its Interim Country Assistance Plan for Iraq (I-CAP)
in
February
2004, at a time when the UK was a joint Occupying Power in Iraq and
security
279.
The I-CAP
re-stated DFID guidance that progress against a CAP should
be
assessed
annually, and that a CAP should be subject to a “major review”
every three or
four years.
The I-CAP stated that, given the rapidly changing situation in
Iraq, it would
need a
“substantial” review after one year.
280.
Mr Anderson
circulated a note on the programme management issues
identified
during his
14 to 19 March visit to Iraq to DFID colleagues only on 4 April
2005.159
281.
Mr Anderson
highlighted the next 12 months as a critical period for DFID’s
Iraq
programme
and a “key window for donor impact”. US and UK development
spending
was set to
reduce after 2006 and the UK military presence, upon which donor
activities
in the
South relied, might draw down.
282.
Mr Anderson
also highlighted two DFID policy papers with implications for
DFID’s
programme
in Iraq. The first, on fragile states, emphasised the importance of
realistic
expectations
of host government capacity and of prioritising and sequencing
activities
to avoid
overwhelming it. The second, on security and development,
highlighted the
importance
of personal safety and security for the poor, and emphasised that
activities
to promote
effective security systems were integral to development work. The
DFID Iraq
team would
meet to consider the implications of the papers in the next few
months.
283.
Mr Anderson
detailed the work required to bring DFID’s programme for
2005/06
within the
new budget. Current commitments exceeded the new budget “by several
tens
of millions
of pounds”.
157
Report
Riley, 5 April 2005, ‘GOC MND(SE) southern Iraq Update – 5 April
2005’.
158
Department
for International Development, Iraq:
Interim Country Assistance Plan, February
2004.
159
Minute
Anderson to DFID [junior official], 4 April 2005, ‘Iraq Programme
Management Issues’.
241