The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
would mean
extending the UK military presence in the South beyond
current
planned
dates for transition (PRTs would require appropriate force
protection
and Quick
Response Forces), and require significant additional resources
for
programmes
and security.
•
Establish
one PRT in Basra to cover all of MND(SE). That would not affect
UK
plans for
transition in the other three southern provinces. The US might want
to
establish
its own PRTs in those provinces, increasing Iraqi resentment of the
US
presence
and raising presentational difficulties in the UK if the US was
seen to
take over
from the UK in the UK’s area.
•
Transition
from “(mini) PRTs” in four provinces towards a single “super-PRT”
in
Basra. That
would ensure coverage across MND(SE) but would not affect
UK
451.
The IPU
assessed that while none of the options was “satisfactory”, the
third option
was best.
It would permit continued governance and capacity-building work in
all four
provinces,
would not affect UK military transition planning, and would
minimise security
risks to
civilian staff.
452.
The IPU
recommended that DOP(I):
•
Agree that
the UK establish a PRT structure in southern Iraq, with Iraqi
buy-in.
•
Agree that
the focus of the PRT should be on improving co-ordination
and
delivery of
UK assistance, strengthening the links between the central
authorities
and
Governorates, and improving the UK’s “strategic oversight” of
southern Iraq.
•
Accept that
while there were “presentational advantages” in establishing a
PRT
in MND(SE),
improvements in the effectiveness of the UK’s engagement
would
be
“marginal”.
•
Note that
while the PRT models might encourage other coalition partners
to
engage in
reconstruction in the South (early indications were that Germany
and
Japan might
supply experts or funding), multilateral donors were known to
be
sceptical
about the PRT model and were unlikely to engage fully.
•
Adapt the
US PRT model to suit local circumstances in the four
southern
provinces:
{{In
Basra, the current effort should be “re-organised along PRT
lines”,
with the
addition of a UK senior civil servant as its head. This
regional
“super‑PRT”
would comprise around 30 civilian staff, 21 military
officers,
and between
20 and 30 locally engaged staff.
{{In Dhi
Qar, the current effort should also be “re-organised along PRT
lines”,
possibly
staffed and led by Italy until transition.
{{In
Maysan and Muthanna, the current effort should continue “under
a
PRT banner”
until UK military transition, at which time Iraqi teams
could
259
Paper IPU,
28 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Provincial Reconstruction
Teams’.
272