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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
in the defence programme (except when provided from UORs or USURs funded by
a claim on the Reserve – see Section 13.1). Sir Peter Spencer, Chief of Defence
Procurement from May 2003 to April 2007, told the Inquiry that using money from the
capital Equipment Programme to deal with the short term had “a fratricidal effect”19 on
the ability to move the FRES programme forward.
46.  The focus of the Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) on the FRES
programme may therefore provide a partial explanation for the lack of urgency in
addressing the more immediate problem of the PPV capability gap. Another likely
factor was an over‑optimistic assumption about the timing of withdrawal from Iraq.
The expectation of an early withdrawal from Iraq inhibited action on an expensive
programme that might not be completed before troops left.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR)
47.  The MOD was aware before 2003 that it needed to broaden the capabilities
available for collecting strategic, operational and tactical intelligence. A clear capability
gap for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to be directed by commanders on the ground
had been identified. The longer‑term solution was a programme known as Watchkeeper,
expected to be introduced in 2005 to 2006.
48.  From March 2003, the Phoenix UAV was available to commanders in theatre.
It performed well during the invasion but could only be used between November and
April because it was not designed to operate in high temperatures.
49.  For the first four years of Op TELIC, the lack of ISTAR capabilities constrained
military operations. The final DOC report on Op TELIC in March 2010 stated that an
enduring intelligence picture had been lacking for “at least the first four years”20 because
“up to and throughout 2006 and into 2007, there were insufficient ISTAR assets available
to MND(SE), and hence by necessity they were focused on maintaining as much of the
day‑to‑day tactical picture as possible”.
50.  There is evidence that the MOD took two steps which did not adequately meet the
capability gap:
A “mini UAV”, Desert Hawk 1, was introduced in December 2003. Because of
technical limitations it was only in theatre for a very short period.
A Combined Joint Predator UAV Task Force (CJPTF) was created with the US
in January 2004 but the UK’s requests for access to the capability were often
not met.
19  Public hearing, 26 July 2010, pages 40‑50.
20  Report DOC, 17 March 2010, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Vol. 4’.
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