The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in the
defence programme (except when provided from UORs or USURs funded
by
a claim on
the Reserve – see Section 13.1). Sir Peter Spencer, Chief of
Defence
Procurement
from May 2003 to April 2007, told the Inquiry that using money from
the
capital
Equipment Programme to deal with the short term had “a fratricidal
effect”19
on
the ability
to move the FRES programme forward.
46.
The focus of
the Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) on the
FRES
programme
may therefore provide a partial explanation for the lack of urgency
in
addressing
the more immediate problem of the PPV capability gap. Another
likely
factor was
an over‑optimistic assumption about the timing of withdrawal from
Iraq.
The expectation
of an early withdrawal from Iraq inhibited action on an
expensive
programme
that might not be completed before troops left.
47.
The MOD was
aware before 2003 that it needed to broaden the
capabilities
available
for collecting strategic, operational and tactical intelligence. A
clear capability
gap for an
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to be directed by commanders on the
ground
had been
identified. The longer‑term solution was a programme known as
Watchkeeper,
expected to
be introduced in 2005 to 2006.
48.
From March
2003, the Phoenix UAV was available to commanders in
theatre.
It performed
well during the invasion but could only be used between November
and
April
because it was not designed to operate in high
temperatures.
49.
For the first
four years of Op TELIC, the lack of ISTAR capabilities
constrained
military
operations. The final DOC report on Op TELIC in March 2010 stated
that an
enduring
intelligence picture had been lacking for “at least the first four
years”20
because
“up to and
throughout 2006 and into 2007, there were insufficient ISTAR assets
available
to MND(SE),
and hence by necessity they were focused on maintaining as much of
the
day‑to‑day
tactical picture as possible”.
50.
There is
evidence that the MOD took two steps which did not adequately meet
the
capability
gap:
•
A “mini
UAV”, Desert Hawk 1, was introduced in December 2003. Because
of
technical
limitations it was only in theatre for a very short
period.
•
A Combined
Joint Predator UAV Task Force (CJPTF) was created with the
US
in January
2004 but the UK’s requests for access to the capability were
often
not met.
19
Public
hearing, 26 July 2010, pages 40‑50.
20
Report DOC,
17 March 2010, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Vol. 4’.
236