The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
164.
In her
covering letter, Baroness Amos wrote that “the UK focus in security
in the
South,
leaving security in Baghdad largely to the US, is not good
enough”.
165.
Baroness Amos’
Principal Private Secretary reported that Baroness Amos
had
asked
Mr Vieira de Mello whether the establishment of a Political
Council, followed by
the
drafting and agreement of a Constitution leading to elections in
around two years
would be
acceptable to the Iraqi people.64
Mr Vieira
de Mello thought there was a danger
that they
would say it was too little, too late:
“But with a
clear road map and timeframe, showing them that their humiliation
was
finite; and
if the PC [Political Council] and interim ministers were given
real, tangible
responsibilities
… he thought they could be persuaded to be realistic. And if
the
PC was
genuinely representative from across Iraq, he believed that the
Secretary-
General and
he would be able to recommend the Security Council accept it as
the
Interim
Authority set out in SCR 1483.”
166.
Baroness Amos
subsequently asked Ambassador Bremer if there was a
timeframe
for the
political process. He indicated that the Political Council should
be set up by
mid-July,
and the Constitutional Council shortly after that. Once the
Councils had been
established,
Ambassador Bremer was reluctant to impose any deadlines, believing
that
responsibility
for doing so should lie with the Iraqi people
themselves.
167.
Reporting to
No.10 on security and troop levels in Iraq on 1 July,
Mr Hoon’s Private
Secretary
wrote:
“Security
situation in Iraq varies from area to area: but we do
not
currently
judge that Al Majar Al Kabir was the start of a trend, but
rather
168.
The Private
Secretary reported that the security environment remained very
difficult
in places,
particularly in and around Baghdad and Fallujah. The MOD had
considered
whether
troop reinforcements would make a difference:
“… we
continue to assess that we have the right size and shape of forces
to do the
job. The
British Commander, General Wall, is aware that reinforcements could
be
generated
if he judged that they were needed.”
169.
General Sir
Peter Wall told the Inquiry that the incidents in Majar
al-Kabir:
“… turned
out to be consistent with the broad mood across Maysan as it
developed
over time,
and … the events in 2004 in al-Amara … were really linked to that
sort of
same
resentment against our presence.”66
64
Minute
Bewes to Malik, 28 June 2003, ‘Meeting with Sérgio De
Mello’.
65
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 1 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Security and Troop
Levels’.
66
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, pages 57-58.
232