9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
of
interested parties on “where we are going with [NAME OF
OPERATION]”. The
responses
were summarised as “we do not want merely to be buying JAM
quiescence
with
releases; we do not want to be seen to be appeasing terrorists; we
do not want to
enter into
an open-ended pork-barrel process; we do not want to be seen to be
favouring
one
political trend over another”.
355.
Mr Day
sent Ms Aldred a “first cut” of options for future UK force levels
in southern
Iraq on 11
September.180
While
emphasising that the analysis remained provisional and
needed
further work, he outlined four options:
•
A minimal
contribution of 250-750 personnel, embedded within mainly US
units
to provide
niche training or support to the Iraqis and/or the
coalition.
•
A
1,500-strong battlegroup or equivalent, plus logistic support,
embedded within
a US
formation, primarily to continue SSR but with a limited combat
capability.
•
A one- or
two-star HQ plus two battlegroups and limited logistic and
enabling
capabilities,
totalling around 2,500 personnel, to form the framework of
a
multi‑national
brigade.
•
A
500-strong framework brigade with a one- or two-star HQ, two battle
groups
and full
logistic and enabling support capabilities, able to operate without
US
support.
356.
The initial
MOD view was that the third of these was the minimum
contribution
necessary
to retain the UK’s lead nation and principal ally status in
MND(SE), but that
would need
to be tested with the US. All options except the final one would
require
significant
US logistic and enabling support.
357.
MOD officials
advised Mr Browne’s Private Secretary on 11 September that,
as
previously
agreed, 11 internees would be released the following day and noted
that
advice on
the long-term future of the operation would follow
shortly.181
Referring
to a
“step
reduction” in attacks on coalition forces since the start of the
process, the advice
said that
there was “merit in pursuing this process”.
358.
The advice
included a substantial section on presentation, referring to
articles in
The Sunday
Times and
The
Guardian. There had
been some follow-up interest and
Parliamentary
interest was anticipated. As a result:
“We have
reflected on whether and how we should adjust our
presentational
approach to
this issue. At some point, some aspects of the overall strategy
need
to be
explained to the public and Parliament and also to the families of
service
personnel
who have been killed in Iraq. The best means of doing so might be
as
part of a
wider piece on Iraq strategy … rather than a media event focusing
solely
on [NAME OF
OPERATION] issues. If the Secretary of State agrees, we will
develop
180
Letter Day
to Aldred, 11 September 2007, ‘Iraq – Options for UK Military
Contribution’.
181
Minute Keay
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 September 2007, ‘Op TELIC:
discussions with JAM’.
251